Is Another World Possible?: Herbert Marcuse and Possibilities for \u27Real\u27 Change by Halperin, Robert
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 
8-19-2021 12:30 PM 
Is Another World Possible?: Herbert Marcuse and Possibilities for 
'Real' Change 
Robert Halperin, The University of Western Ontario 
Supervisor: Pero, Allan, The University of Western Ontario 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in 
Theory and Criticism 
© Robert Halperin 2021 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd 
 Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Halperin, Robert, "Is Another World Possible?: Herbert Marcuse and Possibilities for 'Real' Change" (2021). 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 8016. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/8016 
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of 





It has been difficult to effect concrete changes in our society that might adequately 
approach confronting the intersecting crises of capitalism, inequality, and ecology that we 
face in our era. Herbert Marcuse’s critical theory, and his notion of quantitative 
development leading to qualitative change, in combination with Hannah Arendt’s theories 
of action, natality, and the will, provide us with an appropriate lens through which to view 
these crises and diagnose the problems at hand. Additionally, Thomas Kuhn’s concepts of 
paradigms and ‘normal science,’ as well as Richard Rorty’s distinction between 
movements and campaigns provide us with more concrete ideas of what ‘quantitative 
development’ means. Paul Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor and metaphoricity can provide us 
with an understanding of what a guiding principle, such as inspiration or hope, can help us 
to achieve in attempting to effect concrete change. We must aim to make real the phrase 















Summary for Lay Audience 
In this thesis, my aim is to outline the value of Herbert Marcuse’s critical theory for the 
current era. His diagnosis of the problems that Western society and its population faced 
during the 1950s–70s, though, is not completely adequate to address the problems that we 
face in our age. Therefore, I aim to augment his critical theory with Hannah Arendt’s 
concepts of action, natality, and the will. Action is the uniquely human capacity to 
participate in the public sphere, especially in the context of politics—understood in the 
Ancient Greek sense of the word. Natality is the uniquely human capacity to introduce 
novelty into the world, which is to say that we can interrupt natural processes of biology 
and history. The will is the internal human capacity to project oneself into the future, 
willing that one does a certain thing and not another. It is characterized by the posture of 
an ‘I-will,’ and it aims to become an ‘I-will-and-I-can.’ The combination of Marcuse and 
Arendt’s various theories and concepts leads us to an ideal of politics, as developed by 
Christopher Holman. I tease out the possibilities that this will present to us, but conclude 
that it is difficult for us to achieve that ideal in our present state. Therefore, I turn to Thomas 
Kuhn, Richard Rorty, and Paul Ricoeur. Each of these three thinkers provides us with 
concepts that allow us to imagine the quantitative steps that we can take now that will, 
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1 Affluent Society? More Like…           
The current era is replete with crises of capitalism. The system no longer “delivers the 
goods” as it did in the mid-20th century,1 and the majority of the population’s material 
conditions are inadequate relative to the system’s well-publicized ‘benefits.’ This situation 
differs in significant respects from the conditions and context in which Herbert Marcuse 
wrote his strongest critiques; that is, what John Kenneth Galbraith called the ‘affluent 
society.’2 In that Golden Age of American capitalism, there was an expansive middle class, 
increased purchasing power, and—in the industrialized West—relatively widespread 
prosperity.3 Labour had largely aligned itself with capital and management in order to 
preserve the status quo, and opposition to the established system appeared foolish, because 
the system, in general, delivered the goods. However, labour’s accommodating posture and 
its overall openness to the given organization of society allowed for the slow atrophy of 
this apparently amicable situation. As the century drew to a close, wages grew stagnant, 
and globalization efforts after the collapse of the USSR dammed up economic prosperity 
for the masses. Successive recessions in the ‘80s and ‘90s, followed by the tech bubble 
burst in the early 2000s, and, finally, the “Great Recession” decimated the wages of vast 
swathes of workers in intersecting industries.4 The ‘precariat’ ballooned and the situation 
for the majority of the population deteriorated further. We stand on very different ground 
than did Marcuse when he, at the peak of his popularity, tapped into the political 
consciousness of various protest movements and became known as the “guru” of the New 
Left. Despite the significant differences in our historical contexts, much of his economic, 
political, cultural, and psychological critique of the established system of post-World War 
II American society remains quite relevant—if not directly applicable to contemporary 
society. 
 
1 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 2nd ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), 84. 
2 See: John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958). 
3 See: Michael Forman, “Marcuse in the Crisis of Neoliberal Capitalism: Revisiting the Occupation,” in 
The Great Refusal: Herbert Marcuse and Contemporary Social Movements, eds. Andrew Lamas, Todd 
Wolfson, Peter Funke (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2017). 





Marcuse decries the integration of the working class, which is the result of intersecting 
economic, socio-cultural, political, and psychological factors, each of which—in unique 
ways—speaks to the Establishment’s effective containment of opposition to the system it 
perpetuates. Marcuse describes advanced industrial society as “one-dimensional” because 
these various containment mechanisms maintain social control and circumscribe the 
possibilities of critical opposition to the established order. The three main features of 
affluent society in which Marcuse locates the mechanisms of containment are: the 
production of false needs; the new form of politics, which aligns the entire population 
against a perpetual Enemy, thereby securing both the “National Purpose” and the welfare-
warfare state; and operationalism and positivism in sociology, political science, and 
analytic philosophy, which translate potentially liberating, transcendent concepts (e.g., 
freedom and democracy) into affirmative statements that prop up the status quo. Each of 
these features is bound up in the rapid proliferation and development of technology in 
society’s productive apparatus. “Technological rationality has become political 
rationality,”5 and thereby informs the organization of society. However, this rationality is 
irrational insofar as it has its telos in the amelioration of suffering and the elimination of 
toil, while it simultaneously serves to contain and restrict opposition to the established 
system in order to perpetuate this system. Through his use of dialectical logic and analysis, 
Marcuse critiques the mechanisms of containment, which produce and reproduce one-
dimensional man in advanced industrial society, and his critical theory uncovers 
technological rationality’s irrationality by dissecting the contradictions inherent in the 
established system itself.  
In the first section of this chapter, I outline the aforementioned salient mechanisms of 
containment in order to provide a contextual framework through which we can understand 
the central question of Marcuse’s work: “how can the people who have been the object of 
effective and productive domination by themselves create the conditions of freedom?”6 
Affluent society appears to be rational, effective, and productive; the masses are, generally, 
 
5 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, xlviii. 





quite satisfied and content with the established system. However, according to Marcuse, 
this satisfaction arises by virtue of manipulated consciousness and domination, from which 
people must liberate themselves. Thus, “the optimal goal,” which ought to guide liberation, 
“is the replacement of false needs by true ones, the abandonment of repressive 
satisfaction.”7 Each of the factors outlined above is a manifestation of repression and 
domination. In the last analysis, the prospects of concrete opposition to the affluent society 
are bleak, and those potentially oppositional, revolutionary groups and individuals with 
whom Marcuse associates himself do not achieve the transformational change he envisions. 
In the second section, I discuss dialectical logic and Marcuse’s concept of the distinction 
between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be,’ which will bring us to a theory of social change: 
quantitative development leading to qualitative change.8 Marcuse’s dialectical logic is 
essential to his critical theory insofar as he aims to, as Douglas Kellner writes, differentiate 
“negative features [of technology/technics] with positive potentials that could be used to 
democratize and enhance human life,”9 without celebrating this technology “as inherently 
an instrument of liberation and progress.”10 Moreover, he aims to expose the repressive 
and oppressive tendencies of a society organized according to technological rationality, 
while he avoids “its technophobic denunciation as solely an instrument of domination.”11 
I address both his criticisms of technology and his appreciation for the possibilities for 
liberation that it produces.  
This chapter outlines the key critical elements of Marcuse’s work, especially the overriding 
concepts at work in his critique of the modes of social control that he discovers in advanced 
industrial society. Although he provides some prescriptive actions, his work did not aim to 
be a guide for the future; rather, his goal was to critique the central means of oppression 
and domination. He did not believe it was possible to provide a blueprint for a new, better 
 
7 Ibid., 7. 
8 Ibid., 221. 
9 Douglas Kellner, “Technology, War and Fascism: Marcuse in the 1940s,” introduction to Collected 
Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol. 1, Technology, War and Fascism (London: Routledge, 1998), 7.  






society, because the institutions of the new society “cannot be determined a priori; they 
will develop, in trial and error, as the new society develops.”12 I conclude with an outline 
of the possibilities for liberation inherent in aesthetics and a ‘new sensibility,’ and 
Marcuse’s move from a call for immediate revolution to a ‘long march through the 
institutions.’ Chapters two and three will address potential visions of a better society, 
incorporating Marcuse’s work as well as the work of Hannah Arendt, Thomas Kuhn, and 
Richard Rorty, among others.  
1.1 Containment Mechanisms: Shall We Be Released? 
Marcuse develops the Marxian concepts of commodity fetishism, consumerism, and 
ideology into a cogent and powerful critical theory of modern consumer society. Beyond 
the economic and social domination which these features engender and enforce, Marcuse 
identifies the impacts they have on the psyche. He argues that consumer society 
manipulates and mutilates the personality, values, and needs of the populace, who now 
“recognize themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi 
set, split-level home, kitchen equipment. The very mechanism which ties the individual to 
his society has changed, and social control is anchored in the new needs that it has 
produced.”13 Instead of personal, subjective existence, Marcuse sees in advanced industrial 
society the “extension” of the “mind and body” into the “object world.”14 And the fact that 
one recognizes himself in the objects and products with which he surrounds himself is “not 
illusion but reality. However, the reality constitutes a more progressive state of alienation. 
The latter has become entirely objective; the subject which is alienated is swallowed up by 
its alienated existence.”15 He does truly recognize himself in his commodities, but this is 
the self of a ‘false consciousness.’ The personal and private spheres of life collapse into 
the social and societal, which diminishes inner freedom: “The manifold processes of 
introjection seem to be ossified in almost mechanical reactions. The result is, not 
 
12 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 86. 
13 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 9. 
14 Ibid. 





adjustment but mimesis: an immediate identification of the individual with his society and, 
through it, with the society as a whole.”16 One-dimensional society implements 
mechanisms of containment and social control by employing both the system of production 
and the culture industry to fully integrate the individual in the system. 
Advanced industrial society imposes false needs upon the populace, and these false needs 
serve to perpetuate and strengthen the system itself by creating products, advertising them, 
and selling them as vital necessities.17 Insofar as it both creates and satisfies false needs, 
this system relies on always-increasing repression of the individual. We can distinguish 
false from true needs insofar as the former “are those which are superimposed upon the 
individual by particular social interests in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil, 
aggressiveness, misery, and injustice.”18 Although Marcuse contends that all human needs 
are historical, he sets up a crucial distinction between true and false needs based in this 
historicity. True needs are those that humans require in order to survive and live well, such 
as food and lodging, and these needs “have an unqualified claim for satisfaction … at the 
attainable level of satisfaction.”19 In other words, we have true, vital needs that demand 
satisfaction, but the satisfaction of these needs is conditioned by the degree of satisfaction 
which can be reasonably expected “under the optimal utilization of the material and 
intellectual resources available to man.”20 False needs, therefore, obtain their falseness by 
virtue of the organization and utilization of material and intellectual resources, which, in 
advanced industrial society, does not operate according to the ‘optimal utilization’ of 
available resources. 
Advanced industrial society’s organization of resources within the productive apparatus is 
repressive insofar as it denies the individual access to the ‘attainable level of satisfaction,’ 
while it compensates for this denial with commodities that grant him fleeting pleasures, 
 
16 Ibid., 10. 
17 Herbert Marcuse, “Liberation from the Affluent Society,” in Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, eds. 
Stephen Bronner and Douglas Kellner (New York: Routledge, 1989), 280. 
18 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 4–5. 
19 Ibid., 5. 





palliating him—despite the promise of true satisfaction and fulfilment.21 In Eros and 
Civilization, Marcuse identifies this sort of repression as ‘surplus-repression,’ as it is “the 
result of specific societal conditions sustained in the specific interest of domination.”22 
Surplus-repression is not necessary for the psyche to develop naturally; it is, in a sense, 
‘leftover’ repression from the stage(s) of societal development when humans needed to 
‘toil’ for the sake of real productivity and survival. The concept of surplus-repression can 
be linked to Marx’s concept of surplus-value, which is the excess value that labour 
produces, but for which the labourer is not compensated. For example, if a labourer is paid 
a wage of twelve dollars per hour, while he produces, through his labour, the value of 
twelve dollars every half-hour (e.g., he operates a machine that makes ‘artisanal’ 
doorknobs), then he is producing twelve dollars in surplus value every hour. Just as surplus-
repression is repression over and above the repression that the psyche may employ in its 
development, surplus value is value that the worker creates in excess of his compensation. 
The need for toil is justified by the “excuse of scarcity,” but this excuse “weakens as man’s 
knowledge and control over nature enhances the means for fulfilling human needs with a 
minimum of toil.”23 As surplus-repression conditions the goals of society’s productive 
apparatus, it begins to conform to the ‘performance principle,’ which is “the reality 
principle” of advanced industrial society.24 Under rule of the performance principle, society 
is “acquisitive and antagonistic,” and it is “in the process of constant expansion[;] … 
control over social labor now reproduces society on an enlarged scale and under improving 
conditions”: 
For the vast majority of the population, the scope and mode of satisfaction are 
determined by their own labor; but their labor is work for an apparatus which they 
do not control, which operates as an independent power to which individuals must 
 
21 Ibid., 5. 
22 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1974), 88. 
23 Ibid., 92. 
24 Ibid., 129. The performance principle is a Marcusean neologism which, in a sense, ‘Marxifies’ the 





submit if they want to live. … Men do not live their own lives but perform pre-
established functions.25 
In other words, the manner in which the establishment distributes and utilizes the available 
material and intellectual resources produces false needs in order to legitimize its own 
perpetuation and promote conformity with expected behaviours, which furthers the state of 
mimetic alienation whereby the individual immediately identifies with his society. 
Through the organization of resources and the productive apparatus, surplus-repression 
serves to keep things the way they are, and this organization thereby functions as a 
mechanism of containment and a form of social control. The production of false needs—
which includes the goods and services that gratify these needs—is one manifestation of 
surplus-repression in advanced industrial society. Moreover, the ‘performance principle’ 
constitutes new individual and social modes of experiencing the world, which transform 
the individual at both the psychological and social levels into an object, an automaton: 
“The efficient individual is the one whose performance is an action only insofar as it is the 
proper reaction to the objective requirements of the apparatus[;] … the former freedom of 
the economic subject was gradually submerged in the efficiency with which he performed 
services assigned to him.”26 The performance principle is not merely a mode of production 
in the labour process; rather, this new reality principle governs the totality of human 
experience in advanced industrial society because the ideology that the culture industry 
packages and sells is inextricable from the performance principle. In other words, the 
workers and labourers in the factories and office complexes operate under this principle 
not only while they work, but the entertainment they consume in their ‘leisure time’ 
reinforces ideological conformity, thereby ensuring that consumers want to look like the 
people on TV who look ‘desirable,’ be like the people who own what is being sold and 
those who sell what is to be owned. The performance principle holds sway over the 
individual both at work and at home:  
 
25 Ibid., 45. 
26 Herbert Marcuse, “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology,” in Collected Papers of Herbert 





In exchange for the commodities that enrich their life, the individuals sell not only 
their labor but also their free time. The better living is offset by the all-pervasive 
control over living. … The repressiveness of the whole lies to a high degree in its 
efficacy: it enhances the scope of material culture, facilitates the procurement of 
the necessities of life, makes comfort and luxury cheaper … while at the same time 
sustaining toil and destruction.27 
The industries of consumption, buying and selling, advertising, and entertainment bolster 
the given, established way of life, and they reassure the individual that what they have is 
the best there is; however, if it is not, then they can buy better for less and finally live the 
life they have been dreaming of for all these years.  
For Marcuse, whether or not this alienation, objectification, and repression is necessary 
remains a question; if it is not, then it can change or be changed, and the individual can 
achieve liberation. In Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, Douglas Kellner 
describes this situation: the social order “restricts [the individual’s] freedom and 
possibilities for happiness, fulfilment and community, while providing commodities and a 
way of life that impedes development of a more rational social order.”28 Furthermore, the 
affluence of advanced industrial society “depends on production of waste and destruction, 
while its wealth rests on exploitation,” and the productivity demanded by the performance 
principle “is ‘repressive’ because it forces unnecessary social labour and consumption on 
its population.”29 However, this need not be the case: the current level of technological 
development and the productive capacity of advanced industrial society could eliminate 
scarcity, in turn eliminating the need for toil, which would thus eliminate alienated 
labour.30 Liberation from this situation would necessarily entail the individual himself 
 
27 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 100. 
28 Douglas Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (London: Macmillan, 1984), 244. 
29 Ibid., 244–45. 
30 On this point, Marcuse favours automation of the most alienating aspects of labour. See Marcuse, Eros 
and Civilization, pp. 93, 152; One-Dimensional Man, pp. 2, 16, 36–37. Although this chapter does not 
focus heavily on automation (my main focus is the containment of opposition and social control), I briefly 





recognizing what his true needs are, distinguishing them from false needs, and rejecting 
the false needs in favour of the true ones. Once again, however, the dilemma arises: “how 
can people who have been the object of effective and productive domination by themselves 
create the conditions of freedom?”31 The false needs and repressive organization of 
resources within the productive apparatus seem to preclude the possibility of people 
recognizing the oppressive situation in which they live and, therefore, achieving liberation.  
Before moving on to the means by which Marcuse proposes we could achieve this 
liberation, we must address two other modes of social control: first, the new form of 
politics, which involves the union of previously opposed elements of society against a 
common Enemy, and allows for a “national purpose” and the welfare/warfare state; second, 
linguistic operationalism, which translates potentially liberating, transcendent concepts, 
such as freedom and democracy, into affirmative statements that prop up the status quo, 
thereby collapsing the critical dimension of the mind. 
The United States emerges from the second World War as one of two major global powers 
and, since the New Deal and Keynesian economics had quelled much of the stateside 
radical Leftist movements,32 the US is able to present itself as the champion of freedom, 
democracy, and happiness, all of which are threatened by the USSR and global 
communism. In Western advanced industrial society, “capital and labour are allied under 
the threat of Communism,”33 and, to this end, we enter a new phase of societal 
development, unified in its purpose. “[T]he features of the Welfare State and the Warfare 
State” combine to form the “society of total mobilization,” in which the following 
stabilizing forces emerge: 
concentration of the national economy on the needs of the big corporations, with 
the government as a stimulating, supporting, and sometimes even controlling force; 
hitching of this economy to a world-wide system of military alliances, monetary 
 
31 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 6. 
32 Forman, “Marcuse in the Crisis of Neoliberal Capitalism,” 31–32.  





arrangements, technical assistance and development schemes; gradual assimilation 
of blue-collar and white-collar population, of leadership types in business and 
labor.34 
Those elements of society which, previously, had functioned as countervailing powers, 
such as capital and production, socio-economic classes, government, and political/state 
military and police forces, undermine their own strength as countervailing powers. They 
confront each other in the political, social, and economic spheres, but they “cancel each 
other out in a higher unification … [and] tend to make the whole immune against negation 
from within as well as without; … the Enemy [i.e. the USSR, the communist, the 
Bolshevik] is permanent. He is not in the emergency situation but in the normal state of 
affairs[;] … he is thus being built into the system as a cohesive power.”35 By virtue of the 
domestically and internationally recognized real existence of the permanent Enemy, it is 
perfectly legitimate for the state to demand that a highly motivated, productive, and 
efficient workforce demonstrate the utmost ‘patriotism,’36 and, furthermore, it is legitimate 
for the state to practice heightened military aggression on the world stage—cheered on by 
the population. The powerful groups and forces of society, such as government, labour, 
capital, mass media, and so on, oppose each other only superficially. The countervailing 
powers of advanced industrial society pose no threat to the system as a whole; rather, they 
oppose each other only insofar as such opposition affirms and reaffirms the legitimacy of 
the current system, thereby reproducing the system as it is. The Enemy is without and, 
relative to the Enemy’s real negation of the system, domestic countervailing powers 
become mere alternatives within the system; moreover, the external Enemy’s existence 
itself becomes a power within the system insofar as it serves to bolster the unity, cohesion, 
and legitimacy of the nation as a whole. 
In order for this complete integration of countervailing powers to succeed, the state must 
provide at least enough to ‘satisfy’ the individual in advanced industrial society, to 
 
34 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 19. 
35 Ibid., 51. 





compensate for the atrophying sphere of individual freedom and critical thought. 
“Mobilized against” the permanent Enemy, “capitalist society shows an internal union and 
cohesion unknown at previous stages of industrial civilization. It is a cohesion on very 
material grounds; mobilization against the enemy works as a mighty stimulus of production 
and employment, thus sustaining the high standard of living.”37 The ‘national purpose’ 
fuels the ever-increasing efficiency of the productive apparatus; meanwhile, the Welfare 
State, because it is “capable of raising the standard of administered living,”38 becomes the 
means by which the possibilities of liberation, of opposing the system from within, shrink 
and become “socially useless” to the population.39 Advanced industrial society requires 
“the intensified development and expansion of productivity,” and freedom and opposition 
decline as “an objective societal process,” because “the production and distribution of an 
increasing quantity of goods and services make compliance a rational technological 
attitude.”40 Marcuse does not argue that a rising standard of living is necessarily 
domination through the threat of the Enemy. He recognizes that productivity and the rising 
standard of living do not depend on the Enemy, “but their use for the containment of social 
change and perpetuation of servitude does [depend on the Enemy]. The Enemy is the 
common denominator of all doing and undoing. And the Enemy is … the real spectre of 
liberation.”41 The question is not whether a rising ‘standard of living’ is good, but whether 
the standard by which such life is measured is itself good or necessary; that is, by whose 
standard does society measure the goodness of the individual’s life? Does this new, higher 
standard of living benefit the people whose lives it evaluates, or does it benefit those who 
profit from the means by which this standard ‘rises,’ thereby perpetuating unfreedom and 
repression? 
 
37 Ibid., 21. 
38 Ibid., 48. 
39 Ibid., 2. 
40 Ibid., 48. 





Fredric Jameson recognizes this aspect of Marcuse’s thought as an analysis of the “nature 
of the negative itself.”42 The context that informs Marcuse’s critical theory is an 
environment “in which the possibility of eliminating poverty and hunger definitively for 
the first time in history goes hand in hand with the technical possibility of unparalleled 
control and total organization in the realm of social life.”43 Thus, his critical theory raises 
the question of what happiness can mean in this world, that is, in a world in which people 
may not know what they truly want or need: can the individual’s “subjective feeling of 
contentment” be an accurate litmus test of “the social good” when his world is one “in 
which brainwashing and manipulation exist as everyday mechanisms?”44 This is why, as 
we will discuss below, Marcuse advocates for negative thinking, despairs at the loss of the 
critical dimension of the mind, and sees in utopian thinking a potent, negative antidote to 
the practical, positivist mentality of advanced industrial society.45 
Marcuse’s critical approach to the given concepts of advanced industrial society, such as 
the standard of living (described above), shows the irrationality in the system’s rationality, 
the unfreedom of the system’s freedom, and the undemocratic mechanisms in the system’s 
democracy. Rather than opposing each other, these opposites are united in the established 
system to such an extent that, in this context, it becomes ridiculous to oppose the high 
standard of living on the basis of a claim that the society which has produced the ‘good 
life’ lacks some abstract notion of freedom. Advanced industrial society, which declaims 
the absolute freedom of its citizens, wields ‘liberty’ as 
a powerful instrument of domination. … Free election of masters does not abolish 
the masters or the slaves. Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services 
does not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain social controls over a 
life of toil and fear—that is, if they sustain alienation.46 
 
42 Fredric Jameson, “Versions of a Marxist Hermeneutic,” in Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century 
Dialectical Theories of Literature (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1974), 108. 
43 Ibid., 107. 
44 Ibid., 108. 
45 Ibid., 111. 





Herein lies the irrationality of the system: the so-called freedoms and liberties of the citizen 
of advanced industrial society are only those that the system makes available to him. He is 
free to choose any option—so long as it is on this pregiven list of options. He cannot choose 
a different list, nor can he choose not to choose. Furthermore, he truly feels as though the 
options given by the system are, if not the only options, the best options. Here again, we 
come to the dilemma at the centre of Marcuse’s critique: how do people begin to choose 
another world, society, or life if they cannot recognize that society’s unfreedoms, which 
are sold to them as freedoms, are in fact unfreedoms, and that there are other possibilities? 
Marcuse attributes and correlates the closing of the universe of possibilities to various 
elements of advanced industrial society, but the most prominent objects of his criticisms 
are technological rationality and the one-dimensional language of operationalism. At this 
point, we will focus on the latter. 
Within the universe of discourse, especially in the humanities and analytic philosophy, 
Marcuse diagnoses endemic positivism; there is an almost instinctual affirmation of ‘what 
is,’ as against the possibility of change and ‘what ought to be’ or ‘what could be.’ For the 
majority of the population, “the system delivers the goods,”47 which leads to a new 
conformity with the way things are: “The Happy Consciousness … sustains a society … 
which prolongs and improves life more regularly than before. … The power over man 
which this society has acquired is daily absolved by its efficacy and productiveness.”48 The 
society of total mobilization is, in much the same way, the society of total administration, 
and it has its own discourse, which “is deprived of the mediations which are the stages of 
the process of cognition and cognitive evaluation. The concepts which comprehend the 
facts and thereby transcend the facts are losing their authentic linguistic representation,” 
and the new “linguistic form militates against a development of meaning.”49 As an 
example, Marcuse cites what he calls the “self-validating hypotheses” that permeate one-
dimensional language: “‘free’ are the institutions which operate (and are operated on) in 
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the countries of the Free World; … ‘Socialistic’ are all encroachments on private 
enterprises not undertaken by private enterprise itself (or by government contracts).”50 
More troubling, though, is the way in which the populace has come to accept the 
contradictions at the core of these self-validating hypotheses: “That a political party which 
works for the defense and growth of capitalism is called ‘Socialist,’ and a despotic 
government ‘democratic,’ and a rigged election ‘free’” are not new linguistic phenomena, 
but “the general acceptance of these lies by public and private opinion, the suppression of 
their monstrous content” is new.51 ‘The contradiction’ is no longer an offense against logic; 
the rationality of our society incorporates the contradiction and deploys it for manipulative 
purposes. Marcuse draws a bizarre and novel element of modern public discourse to our 
attention: rather than hiding the contradictions in their logic, capital and state power tout 
them. This new unification of opposites, of contradictions in the language of daily life is 
one facet of the affirmative posture which has become typical of the individual in one-
dimensional society.  
The unification of opposites in the language of total administration serves to close the 
system against any opposition because it can incorporate any contradiction. The system 
can exhibit its contradictions because they symbolize the great tolerance of its institutions, 
its pluralism. “Nevertheless,” Marcuse writes, this 
language testifies to the repressive character of this unity. This language speaks in 
constructions which impose upon the recipient the slanted and abridged meaning, 
the blocked development of content, the acceptance of that which is offered in the 
form in which it is offered. … It is the well-known technique of the advertisement 
industry, where it is methodically used for ‘establishing an image’ which sticks to 
the mind and to the product[.] … The reader or listener is expected to associate (and 
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does associate) with them a fixated structure of institutions, attitudes, aspirations, 
and he is expected to react in a fixated, specific manner.52 
Here, again, Marcuse recognizes and criticizes the automatic reactions and mimetic 
behaviours engendered in the individual by the institutions of society.53 To further illustrate 
his point, Marcuse quotes a Time magazine article about the governor of Georgia: 
“‘Georgia’s high-handed, low-browed governor … had the stage all set for one of his wild 
political rallies last week.’ The governor, his function, his physical features, and his 
political practices are fused together in one indivisible and immutable structure.”54 In this 
example, the language assimilates all (potentially) incommensurate aspects of the governor 
into the description of him, which “leaves no space for distinction, development, 
differentiation of meaning; it moves and lives only as a whole.”55 We picture the governor 
in exactly the manner which the given image (and its giver) expects. The image is 
absolutely concrete; its meaning is fixed and non-conceptual. The language of total 
administration sacrifices the concept, and conceptual thought, at the altar of the image: a 
new idolatry. By means of the linguistic abridgment—and other mechanisms by which the 
concept is reduced to the given—operationalism “repels recognition of the factors behind 
the facts, and thus repels recognition of the facts, and of their historical content. … The 
unified, functional language is an irreconcilably anti-critical and anti-dialectical 
language.”56 This mode of thought and discourse suppresses history, and it thereby 
functions as a mechanism of containment and a mode of social control. The world, society, 
objects, and human relations all come to be understood in terms of what is given. 
Things lose their historicity, and the possibilities of thinking, doing, and being otherwise 
collapse. In operational rationality, “the ‘other’ dimension of thought,” that is, the 
“historical dimension—the potentiality as historical possibility, its realization as historical 
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event” is suppressed, and this is “a suppression of history, … a political affair. It is 
suppression of the society’s own past—and of its future, inasmuch as this future invokes 
the qualitative change, the negation of the present.”57 The suppression of the past is 
simultaneously the suppression of the future because it is in and through the recognition of 
one’s contingency and historical context—the recognition that things could be different, 
that another world is possible—that one may resist and oppose the given world in order to 
create a different future than that projected by the dominant forces of the present. However, 
the prevailing mode of thought and behaviour denies this ‘recognition through 
remembrance’ because advanced industrial society’s mode of production and its 
rationality—operationalist, technological rationality—inveigh against the alternatives. As 
it suppresses history and reduces concepts to images, the language of total administration 
“comes to rest in alternative techniques of manipulation and control. … It denies or absorbs 
the transcendent vocabulary; it does not search for but establishes and imposes truth and 
falsehood.”58 Crucially, however, while the people do not necessarily believe all that this 
language imposes as true and false, they behave just as the language demands: “One does 
not ‘believe’ the statement of an operational concept but it justifies itself in action—in 
getting the job done,”59 for, as ever, the system ‘delivers the goods.’ One-dimensional man 
produces and reproduces the conformity that the established system enforces, Kellner 
writes, because society “systematically contains and eliminates opposition and dissent.”60 
I will now discuss Marcuse’s dialectical logic, and technological rationality and its 
irrationality. It is through technology that the system orchestrates its most powerful 
suppressions, and, simultaneously, it is through technology that real opposition to the 
system can produce qualitative change. 
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1.2 Historicizing Possibility, De-Reifying What Is 
Against advanced industrial society’s suppression of history, Marcuse emerges as a 
staunch defender of dialectics and history. In his first English book, Reason and 
Revolution, Marcuse lays out his understanding of the dialectical movement of history:  
The dialectical theory of society emphasized the essential potentialities and 
contradictions within this social whole, thereby stressing what could be done with 
society, and also exposing the inadequacy of its actual form. … Hegel’s dialectic 
had set up no inexorable ‘natural’ law of history, but had quite clearly indicated 
that the path of man’s historical practice lay in the direction of freedom.61 
Although he is describing the Hegelian, dialectical theory of society, over the course of his 
career Marcuse builds on this foundational theory. Later, in One-Dimensional Man, 
determined to demonstrate the power of dialectical thought, Marcuse emphasizes the 
distinction between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be,’ and he develops a unique notion of 
the power of the imagination and of aesthetics in striving for liberation. Here, we can look 
to Henri Lefebvre and draw comparisons between Marcuse’s dialectics and those of 
Lefebvre, as well as his critique of philosophical idealism and its constant abstraction. For 
Lefebvre, idealism “represented a systematic denigration of the lived experience of time, 
space and the body,” and he sees it as “an expression of alienation, a loss of control over 
essential human capacities and powers that should by rights be firmly rooted in daily 
experience.”62 (I do not discuss it here, but Lefebvre was also critical of the ‘needs’ that he 
sees society producing in the individual, and which he sees to be another product of this 
alienation.63) Similarly, Marcuse writes that, against the operationalism and positivism that 
aim to preserve the established system and assimilate more and more of the world and its 
objects, dialectical logic “precludes all abstraction which leaves the concrete content [i.e., 
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what is,] alone and behind, uncomprehended.”64 Furthermore, Adorno’s theory of negative 
dialectics provides us with a rigorous account of the ways in which dialectics can be so 
open-ended and refuse the absolute crystallization of the object. Shannon Brincat describes 
the anti-positivistic bent of dialecticians: “dialectics reaches few ‘results’ that the positivist 
would count as being a positive research ‘result,’ and it does not pretend to have discovered 
ontological first principles but instead operates in a ‘perpetual state of suspended 
judgment.’ This is … [something to be] celebrated, because it leads to ongoing and open-
ended change that is not reducible to static ‘answers.’”65 Each society at every distinct stage 
of societal development is the manifestation and realization of the possibilities for change 
that are present in the world, which the society has chosen for itself. 
As described above, Marcuse upholds a distinction between true and false human needs 
and, while the needs are historically conditioned, we can distinguish between them by 
virtue of the organization of the available resources. True needs are vital to human survival 
and, at any given historical stage, these needs are conditioned by the possibilities of their 
satisfaction in terms of the available resources.66 Marcuse argues that each society is a 
historical project which realizes given possibilities, and “[h]istorical truth is comparative; 
the rationality of the possible depends on that of the actual, the truth of the transcending 
project on that of the project in realization.”67 Thus, we can determine the truth of a society 
qua historical project insofar as we can determine whether the “potentialities of the system 
have outgrown its institutions.”68 If the system, in and through its own development, 
produces possibilities which project greater freedom or complete liberation, and it goes on 
to suppress these possibilities, then the system is unfree and the needs it foists upon the 
populace are false because its potentialities have outgrown its institutions. Insofar as any 
given society organizes itself to maintain necessities which are no longer truly necessary, 
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such as scarcity and toil, in order to maintain the established reality, the society (and, 
therefore, those few who control the production process within the system) has made a 
“determinate choice” to contain change that might lead to liberation and to maintain 
domination.69 The historical conditioning of historical projects can be judged according to 
the following criteria, which are the ‘determined’ factors in historical development:  
(1) the specific contradictions which develop within a historical system as 
manifestations of the conflict between the potential and the actual; (2) the material 
and intellectual resources available to the respective system; (3) the extent of 
theoretical and practical freedom compatible with the system. These conditions 
leave open alternative possibilities of developing and utilizing the available 
resources, alternative possibilities of ‘making a living,’ of organizing man’s 
struggle with nature.70 
The point at issue is whether advanced industrial society maintains what is at the expense 
of what ought to be. Marcuse argues that it does—and that the mechanisms of containment 
and social control outlined above serve this purpose.  
Despite these constraints on opposition to the system and the suppression of possibilities 
for liberation, the contradictions within the system potentially allow the individual to 
recognize the system’s irrationality and grasp at these possibilities. Marcuse seizes upon 
technology and technological rationality as the most contradictory facets of the established 
system. Technology projects the amelioration of life’s struggles, the end of alienated 
labour, and more loving relationships between humans as well as between humans and 
nature.71 Simultaneously, however, technology is weaponized, and it becomes an 
instrument for further oppression (domestically and internationally), produces “profitable 
waste” which harms the environment and consumers through planned obsolescence,72 and 
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continually produces more efficient means by which the masses may be dominated—
socially, politically, militarily, privately, economically, and so on. The rationality of 
technology is irrational insofar as its spread and growth undermine its own purpose, that 
is, to overcome necessity and scarcity. Technological rationality thus aims to destroy the 
basis of technology’s proliferation.  
In advanced industrial society, possibilities for the amelioration of toil in production and 
life become realizable through technology. Marcuse notes that production itself has 
become highly mechanized, which could lead to automation of the most alienating portions 
of the productive process. However, in spite of this possibility, the workday has become 
only partially automated, while the system expects the worker to continue to carry out all 
but mechanical actions and reactions in the productive process: “mechanized work in 
which automatic and semi-automatic reactions fill the larger part (if not the whole) of labor 
time remains … exhausting, stupefying, inhuman slavery … [it] is expressive of arrested, 
partial automation, of the coexistence of automated, semi-automated, and non-automated 
sections within the same plant.”73 In Eros and Civilization, Marcuse discusses the fact that, 
in the ‘normal’ mode of work under the performance principle, the individual worker “does 
not satisfy his own impulses, needs, and faculties but performs a pre-established function,” 
and while ‘pleasure’ exists in this labour, “either this pleasure is extraneous (anticipation 
of reward), or it is the satisfaction (itself a token of repression) of being well occupied, in 
the right place, of contributing one’s part to the functioning of the apparatus.”74 The 
worker, alienated from himself while working, comes to function as a piece of machinery. 
By virtue of the very technology which aims to unbind humanity from the chains of 
necessity and toil, we move farther and farther from ourselves.  
Writing during the Golden Age of capitalism that Fordism afforded, Marcuse could not 
foresee the crisis of Fordism itself that occurred in the late 1960s and ‘70s, at least in part 
due to the new developments in computerization and information technologies. In this 
latter, crisis environment, theories of neo- and post-Fordism attempted to discover what its 
 
73 Ibid., 25. 





replacement would or could be. Nick Dyer-Witheford, in his account of the post-Fordist 
theories, describes how Alain Lipietz advances the argument that “the crisis of Fordism 
opens the way to a variety of alternative accumulation regimes. … One could either have 
neo-Fordist regimes—in which informatics duplicate and intensify traditional patterns of 
exploitation—or truly post-Fordist systems, which take advantage of the new technological 
opportunities for reskilling and responsibility.”75 However, critics of this argument say that 
this sort of optimistic analysis of the possibilities that technology presents does not 
adequately deal with the sort of specialization that occurs in these new systems. 
“‘[F]lexible specialisation’ segments the workforce between a ‘core’ of permanent skilled 
workers and a ‘periphery’ of casualized and temporary employees.”76 Moreover, Dyer-
Witheford argues, “many theorists of post-Fordism are remarkably silent about the way 
automation and global communication have been deployed to swell the reserve army of the 
unemployed, in a way that ferociously undercuts the strength of movements struggling for 
improved conditions of work and life.”77 The post-Fordist theories, including that of 
Lipietz, possess an “emphasis on the historical adaptability of capital,” which, “taken in 
conjunction [with] the general demoralisation of the left in the 1980s, has led to a very 
rapid acceptance that,” after Fordism, only “another capitalist regime of accumulation” can 
emerge.78 This acceptance “directs attention away from forms of action which might 
challenge” the completion of capitalist restructuring, thereby “shut[ting] the door on 
strategies where workers’ knowledge of new production systems yield, not partnership 
with management, but new ways to challenge managerial command, and new ways in 
which emergent media networks are made to circulate struggles rather than 
commodities.”79 Although the collapse of Fordism was heralded as an opportunity for the 
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individual’s further disassociation from his alienating labour, it is likely that capital’s 
restructuring has only added another link to the chain that binds. 
To both Marx and orthodox Marxian theorists of Marcuse’s era, the industrial working 
class is the revolutionary class—that is, the proletariat—because its existence is the 
negation of the established system. However, in advanced industrial society, technology 
has alleviated many of the burdens suffered by the nineteenth-century industrial working 
class, and the worker is no longer “the beast of burden, by the labor of his body procuring 
the necessities and luxuries of life while living in filth and poverty.”80 By the same token, 
the technology that lifts these burdens requires non-productive workers, such as engineers 
and technicians, to enter into the productive apparatus in order to maintain the instruments 
of production, which reduces the “‘professional autonomy’ of the laborer” because it 
dilutes the composition of the ‘industrial working class.’81 Marcuse recognizes that, while 
this autonomy “was rather his professional enslavement,” the enslavement was “at the same 
time the source of his specific, professional power of negation—the power to stop a process 
which threatened him with annihilation as a human being.”82 Furthermore, these changes 
to his ‘professional autonomy’ “change the attitude and the consciousness of the laborer.”83 
This integration reduces the labouring class’s formerly negative consciousness through the 
dilution of its population, as non-productive workers such as engineers enter the factories 
in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the productive machinery. As a result of these 
changes, the group that constituted Marx’s proletariat is no longer revolutionary; therefore, 
Kellner explains, the composition of the proletariat has changed because the proletariat “is 
pre-eminently a political concept denoting the subject of revolution. … Marcuse insists 
that today the industrial working class is no longer the radical negation of capitalist society 
and is therefore no longer the revolutionary class.”84 The quantitative change to the 
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working class, that is, its dilution by non-productive workers, leads to a qualitative change: 
the consciousness of the worker no longer negates the established system.  
The interplay between quantitative and qualitative change is a central focus of One-
Dimensional Man. Marcuse is searching for possibilities which may lead to qualitative 
change in the lives of individuals, such as real happiness and the gratification of true needs, 
but such change would require that the people themselves bring about their own liberation, 
and, as we have seen, this aporetic dilemma is central to Marcuse’s project: “how can the 
people who have been the object of effective and productive domination by themselves 
create the conditions of freedom?”85 Approaching the issue of the truth-value of historical 
projects, Marcuse argues that “quantitative development becomes qualitative change if it 
attains the very structure of an established system.”86 To an extent, this claim is subtraction 
by addition: through the development of potentialities for liberation by and through the 
system’s internal growth and progress, we achieve a level of development that allows 
people to withdraw from the alienating production apparatus, thereby producing a 
qualitative change in consciousness. However, citing Marx, Marcuse elaborates that, in 
order for the quantitative change to produce this qualitative change, the revolutionary group 
must have the recognition of the need for liberation and the consciousness that will see this 
through prior to the quantitative change: “Transcendence beyond the established 
conditions (of thought and action) presupposes transcendence within these conditions. … 
[T]he rationality and logic invoked in the movement of thought and action is that of the 
given conditions to be transcended. The negation … is a historical project within and 
beyond an already going project, and its truth is a chance to be determined on these 
grounds.”87 However, according to Marcuse, the problem of achieving this transcendence 
within the system remains unsolved until a group or individual in advanced industrial 
society possesses the requisite revolutionary consciousness.88 One-Dimensional Man 
concludes on this pessimistic note. Despite the breadth of the text’s magnificent critique 
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and diagnosis of the problems confronting the individual in advanced industrial society, 
Marcuse cannot find a suitable group to respond to the theory. 
1.3 Conclusion: Not Too Shabby 
Marcuse decries the lack of any strong drive for transformation coming from within 
advanced industrial society. At the end of One-Dimensional Man, he notes the opposition 
that the civil rights movement presents;89 throughout the 1960s, he lauds the oppositional 
tendencies of the New Left and student groups;90 in the late-1960s and through the 1970s 
he turns to the opposition to the system presented by African-American culture and 
“ghettos”;91 and, throughout his late career, he argues for the revolutionary potential of 
non-industrialized nations (many of which were, at the time, fighting for their 
independence from colonial powers or undergoing socialist revolutions). To Marcuse, 
these groups are capable of opposing the established system because they are outsiders, 
they are not yet integrated, and they represent the possibilities of various futures which 
diverge from the given future—toward which advanced industrial society trudges. 
Marcuse’s focus on external groups—external insofar as they are not (yet) integrated—is 
the basis for Fromm’s criticisms of his “catastrophic messianism.”92 However, Kellner 
argues that, in his 1970s writings, Marcuse “stresses disintegrating tendencies and societal 
contradictions, picturing society not as a closed, one-dimensional monolith, but as a system 
of contradictory, shifting tendencies which contains the possibilities of progressive 
transformation and/or barbaric regression.”93 After the popular uprisings of 1968, Marcuse 
publishes An Essay on Liberation, which partakes of the period’s “revolutionary euphoria,” 
while his next work, Counterrevolution and Revolt, “articulates the political realism of a 
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movement which saw in the early 1970s that it was facing a long and difficult struggle to 
transform the existing society.”94 Despite his guru-like role in the New Left and the student 
movements of the 1960s, by that decade’s end Marcuse recognizes the daylight between, 
on the one hand, the goals and consciousness of the New Left and, on the other hand, the 
popular majority and the working class’s satisfactions with the given reality.  
In Marcuse’s later texts, the influence of the New Left and the anti-war protesters on his 
thought is clear; however, in the late ‘60s and throughout the ‘70s he endorses 
revolutionary aesthetics and utopian socialism to a much greater degree than ever before. 
The role of the imagination in Marcuse’s critical theory grows throughout this late period 
of his career, and it performs a vital function in the quantitative-qualitative change formula. 
In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse notes that the revolutionary consciousness must 
recognize “the total impossibility to continue to exist in this universe, so that the need for 
qualitative change is a matter of life and death.”95 And this recognition, he argues, is that 
of the aesthetic imagination: the foundation of what he terms “the new sensibility,” which, 
as he describes in An Essay on Liberation, 
emerges in the struggle against violence and exploitation where this struggle is 
waged for essentially new ways and forms of life: negation of the entire 
Establishment, its morality, culture; affirmation of the right to build a society in 
which the abolition of poverty and toil terminates in a universe where the sensuous, 
the playful, the calm, and the beautiful become forms of existence and thereby the 
Form of the society itself.96  
In this text, Marcuse notes certain relatively minor reforms to the system that subvert the 
system insofar as they serve aesthetic needs rather than the false needs of advanced 
industrial society, such as “better zoning regulations” and “a modicum of protection from 
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noise and dirt.”97 He argues in turn that a “quantity of such reforms would turn into the 
quality of radical change to the degree to which they would critically weaken” the power 
of the privileged classes who exert pressure on the populace by the force of their economic 
and cultural magnitude.98 Here, again, Marcuse asserts that quantitative development can 
become qualitative change—insofar as it has the proper telos; that is, so long as liberation 
is the cause and goal of the change. The quantity of such reforms may reach a critical mass, 
at which point the quantity undergoes a radical shift, becoming quality; this sort of change 
is analogous to exponential growth, as one small change may beget two more, each of 
which begets two more, and so on.  
Unable to find a revolutionary group or subject which presents real opposition to the 
system, Marcuse moves to aesthetics and the imagination because, he argues, the aesthetic 
dimension always already portrays a world other than our own which functions according 
to the order of the beautiful, of Form. By virtue of Form, art “works in the established 
reality against the established reality,” and it “alters experience by reconstructing the 
objects of experience … in word, tone, image. Why? Evidently, the ‘language’ of art must 
communicate a truth, an objectivity which is not accessible to ordinary language and … 
experience.”99 However, this aesthetic truth is essentially powerless to produce change in 
the given reality because, of course, it is the truth of art, which is merely a sensuous object. 
Art, within its domain, can sublimate and diminish pain and necessity, which run rampant 
in the given reality, but “the achievement is illusory, false, fictitious: … the pacifying 
conquest of matter, the transfiguration of the object remain unreal.”100 However, 
imagination remains; radical thought and the ability to imagine that another world is 
possible retain their force in the mind of the individual and the group. 
In contrast, we can look to Adorno’s aesthetics, which articulates a concept of art that 
possesses a more forceful redemptive character. Richard Wolin writes that, for Adorno, 
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“works of art possess a unique saving power,” insofar as they “incorporate” the phenomena 
of our present reality “within the context of a freely articulated, non-coercive totality.”101 
Thus, art can redeem the present reality, and the aesthetic form, which Adorno calls “free 
articulation,”102 is a “positive alternative to the reigning principle of social organization,”103 
which is the instrumental-rational, utilitarian social order. However, again, this redemptive 
concept of aesthetics is not necessarily active or praxis-based; Adorno sloughs off the 
“pragmatic dimension” on which Wolin argues “the essence of aesthetic experience 
depends. … Because he tries to conceive of works of art primarily as vehicles of 
philosophical truth, the entire pragmatic side of works of art—their role in shaping, 
informing, and transforming the lives of historically existing individuals—falls out of 
account.”104 Moreover, Adorno’s understanding of history and his historical context—the 
mid-twentieth century being one of the darkest periods of recent history—further solidified 
his “unreceptiveness to oppositional cultural forms with genuinely exoteric, generalizable 
potential.”105 All this being said, though, there is a weak utopianism within Adorno’s 
aesthetic theory that may prove useful in our pursuit of a way out of the present historical 
trends and crises: 
art presents the familiar and everyday to us in a new and unexpected light, such that 
we are impelled to modify our habitual modes of thought and perception. Thus, 
authentic works of art are the arch-foes of all intellectual complacency and 
positivist affirmation. … Genuine works of art are intrinsically utopian insofar as 
they both highlight the indigent state of reality at present and seek to illuminate a 
path toward what has never-yet-been.106 
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Thus, once again, we affirm the role that aesthetics play in the provision of special insights 
into the repressive and oppressive forces within the present reality. Moreover, we reaffirm 
the power of the imagination, which allows us to envision different possible futures, both 
better and worse, that can provide hope and an impetus for the individual’s active 
participation in the formation of a better future. 
Advanced industrial society’s technological infrastructure and the capacities of its 
productive apparatus, which have thus far always been deployed in the interest of 
domination, exploitation, and repression, render another world possible in reality insofar 
as the possibilities for liberation that they generate contradict the given established system. 
Additionally, technological rationality has co-opted the capabilities of the imagination in 
order to produce what were previously unimaginable horrors, such as firebombing, 
Auschwitz, Hiroshima, and nuclear winter. Against this trend, Marcuse argues that we can 
and must transform the imagination and our technological infrastructure:  
the imagination, sustained by the achievements of science, could turn its productive 
power to the radical reconstruction of experience and the universe of experience. 
In this reconstruction, the historical topos of the aesthetic would change: it would 
find expression in the transformation of the Lebenswelt—society as a work of art.107  
By the time he writes Counterrevolution and Revolt, however, Marcuse’s belief in the 
possibility of immediate transformation wavers; his fear of a proto-fascistic consciousness 
within the United States pushes him toward a recognition of the need for political education 
for the masses. Without this education, no mass movement for human liberation will 
achieve popular support and will therefore be crushed; therefore, Marcuse argues for “an 
effectively organized radical Left,” which will undertake the task of political education, 
thereby “dispelling the false and mutilated consciousness of the people so that they 
themselves experience their condition, and its abolition, as a vital need, and apprehend the 
ways and means of their liberation.”108 Marcuse argues not for neo-Stalinist, statist 
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socialism (he is, in fact, quite critical of ‘Soviet Marxism’109), nor even immediate radical 
revolutionary change, but, as Kellner writes, Marcuse is here proposing “less dramatic 
concepts of social transformation, calling for a ‘long march through the institutions’ and 
the development of ‘counterinstitutions.’”110 This more protracted social transformation, 
Marcuse believes, is the most feasible in late capitalism because the system’s 
contradictions, which produce and promote the needs for liberation, simultaneously—and 
much more aggressively—produce a rapidly strengthening, militarized state power that 
aims to intimidate the individual who dares step out of line. This is the vehicle whereby 
proto-fascist tendencies in the United States could become truly fascistic:  
the courts, used more and more as political tribunals; the reduction of education 
and welfare in the richest country in the world; anti-democratic legislation, such as 
preventive detention and the no-knock laws; economic sanctions if you are 
politically and otherwise suspect; the intimidation and self censorship of the mass 
media. The fact that we cannot point to any charismatic leader, … any SS or SA 
here, simply means that they are not necessary in this country. If necessary, other 
organizations can perform the job, possibly more efficiently.111 
In order for it to be possible to speak of the ‘future of the Left,’ there must remain a Left 
standing in the face of the established system’s counterrevolution, as Kellner writes, “if a 
fascist solution is attempted to solve capitalism’s contradictions, then it is of utmost 
importance that the radical opposition becomes stronger and offers a viable alternative in 
order to become an effective political force in a period of disintegration and change.”112 
Therefore, the Left must refuse disintegration and, instead, focus its energies on organizing 
itself on its own terms, as well as in the context of already existing institutions. 
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Marcuse’s advocacy for a ‘long march through the institutions’ and for political education 
does not necessarily answer the dilemma at the heart of One-Dimensional Man; that is, the 
task of producing conditions in which the individual may recognize the inadequacy of the 
given society, its oppressive tendencies, and the possibility of living and being otherwise. 
Stuart Hall’s concept of discursive struggle, which Fredric Jameson briefly discusses in An 
American Utopia, can help us to expand on the idea of the ‘long march’ and political 
education. Jameson argues that left-wing parties and individuals can  
serve as vehicles and platforms for some renewed public legitimation of hitherto 
repressed and stigmatized transformational policies. … [It] would be incumbent on 
our otherwise impotent social-democratic parties to ‘talk socialism’ and to breathe 
life back into the slogans withered and desiccated by the triumphant poison gas of 
Mrs. Thatcher’s breath. … [S]urely the most important achievement of any such 
exercise in discursive struggle is the rehabilitation of nationalization, and behind 
that, the replacement of the universally detested target of ‘big government’ with the 
more stirring realities of collective commitment.113  
Whether this sort of struggle can be effective in the current period is unclear; the sort of 
‘information warfare’ that may have been productive at shifting opinions in the Thatcher 
years and the subsequent decades could prove to be an outdated understanding of how 
information is delivered and received. Social media and the massive amounts of money 
backing right-wing propaganda outfits might prove to be different in kind rather than 
degree with regard to the transmission of information and discourse. This is not to say that 
a discursive struggle such as Jameson and Hall suggest, and which Marcuse’s ‘long march’ 
hints at, would be absolutely impotent or wrongheaded; rather, it simply may not be 
enough. Despite this fact, Marcuse’s critical theory provides us indispensable tools of 
analysis: the true-false needs dichotomy, technological (ir)rationality, and the quantitative-
qualitative change formula. In the following chapters, I develop these concepts further by 
putting them in dialogue with Hannah Arendt and Richard Rorty. Both of these thinkers 
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straddle a similar blurred boundary to Marcuse’s more explicitly political works. While 
they do not necessarily agree in terms of ideal socio-politico-economic systems, each is 
critical of the diminution of the political and the boundaries between it and the private 
sphere. Through Arendt’s work, I develop a more robust analysis of politically active life; 
meanwhile, through Rorty’s work, I address the possible manifestations and goals of 
political action. The collapse of the critical sphere of the mind as typified by one-
dimensionality has its correlate in the collapse of the impetus for the individual to be 
political in the contemporary era, and my goal is to provide a framework through which 


















2 Where there’s a Will, there’s Arendt 
Hannah Arendt, like Marcuse, was a German-Jewish student of Martin Heidegger’s, and she 
approaches the same politico-socio-economic issues of the mid-twentieth century as does 
Marcuse. She is explicitly (and obviously) neither a Marxist nor an advocate of revolutionary 
change, but she similarly diagnosed the problems that our society confronts: the weakening of 
the critical sphere of the mind; the rise of atomization in the public realm, and a concomitant, 
generalized apathy toward participation in public affairs; and an apparent unwillingness on the 
part of both the politically weak and powerful to enact changes that might improve the world 
in which we live.  
Throughout her career, Arendt wrote and spoke about a variety of issues that ranged from the 
origins of totalitarianism to the unique faculties and capacities of the human mind, and there 
are many points of overlap between her thought and Marcuse’s. In our context, Arendt’s key 
concepts are: i) willing, which is a future-oriented faculty of the human mind, whose objects 
are projects that the individual envisions undertaking; ii) political freedom, which is distinct 
from philosophical freedom, i.e., the freedom of the will, on the one hand, and sovereignty (the 
errant interpolation of philosophical freedom to the political sphere) on the other hand, and 
which is the basis for Arendt’s concept of action; and iii) natality, which is the uniquely human 
capacity for both spontaneity and the introduction of radically new things into the world, that 
is, our constitutive ability to begin. Each of these three concepts overlap and intersect at critical 
junctures. Their usefulness for answering Marcuse’s question, which asks how it is possible 
for dominated and subjugated people to “create,” for themselves, “the conditions of freedom,”1 
lies in this combination; in other words, none of these concepts is enough on its own. To 
illustrate a potential answer to Marcuse’s question, we require: the future-orientedness of the 
will, the political freedom to act in the public sphere, and the capacity to introduce novelty into 
the world.  
In this chapter, along with the discussion of Arendt’s aforementioned crucial concepts, we 
delve deeper into both Marcuse’s early writings about human essence, especially “The Concept 
 





of Essence,”2 and his later work on various possibilities for effecting change in the face of the 
looming, and, in some cases, already underway, ‘counterrevolution’ in the West, especially 
Counterrevolution and Revolt. Through a discussion of these two thinkers’ overlapping 
conceptions of the human capacity for creative expression, and a correlative outlining of the 
salient elements of Arendt’s thought, we develop a potentially meaningful model for the sort 
of political action that might point us toward the possibilities for people taking up their own 
liberation and freedom on their own volition. I am indebted to Christopher Holman’s work, 
Politics as Radical Creation: Herbert Marcuse and Hannah Arendt on Political 
Performativity,3 wherein he juxtaposes these two thinkers in precisely this way, and he argues 
that, in combination, Marcuse and Arendt’s politico-social thought demand a performative 
mode of political action and participation. I draw from his analysis of this combination and 
conduct a discussion of its merits. Additionally, Holman develops a model of politics based on 
the idea of a system of revolutionary councils. I conclude that political performativity, and 
Arendtian action in the public sphere, are ideal as goals to strive for; however, the question of 
arriving at that ideal situation still requires a more robust theory of social change. Thus, despite 
the ingenuity of his argument, I believe we require a more pragmatic approach to making 
change in the present. I develop this approach in my third chapter, with particular reference to 
Rorty’s work, Achieving Our Country, Kuhn’s notions of paradigm shifts and revolutions, and 
Ricoeur’s work on metaphor. 
2.1 They Do Deny Me My Essence 
Ontology and metaphysics have long been guided by the concept of essence, and this 
traditional understanding posits the essence of the human individual as a pure, static, 
unchanging form of Being. For Marcuse, though, essence has a different meaning, and in “The 
Concept of Essence,” he outlines his concept of essence against the backdrop of the historical 
development of the traditional concept. Typically, essence is described as being in tension with 
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appearance; that is, essence is seen as the pure, unchanging form of any given object, and 
appearance is the impure, contingent representation or (imperfect) actualization of that essence 
in the world. What follows is a brief description of the historical development of the concept 
of essence.  
Although essence’s function and position have changed throughout history, there remains a 
common core within the transformations, insofar as each of the concept’s “manifold forms” 
include “the abstraction and isolation of the one true Being from the constantly changing 
multiplicity of appearances.”4 Throughout the bourgeois era, the concept of essence was part 
and parcel of the rationalist revolution in human thought that Descartes inaugurated: rational 
subjectivity, insofar as it is autonomous, “establish[es] and justif[ies] the ultimate essential 
truths on which all theoretical and practical truth depends. The essence of man and of things is 
contained in the freedom of the thinking individual, the ego cogito.”5 Thus, with Descartes’ 
positioning of the essence of the individual within the freedom of thought—internal freedom—
the actual question and problem of essence entered into “the sphere of cognitive subjectivity”: 
“The question of essence—of the truth, unity, and authenticity of Being—became the question 
of the truth, unity, and authenticity of knowledge,” and this remains a fundamental principle 
of freedom of the individual.6 Cartesian radical doubt, combined with his mechanistic 
philosophy, “expressed the new, self-possessed individuality that appeared with demands for 
the free shaping of the conditions of life and for the subjection of nature and its newly 
discovered wealth.”7 However, the reality of bourgeois society pushes back against the 
possibilities for liberation that Descartes envisions with his practical philosophy, because the 
newly liberated individual, as soon as he steps into the world to act, “sees himself subjected to 
the laws of the commodity market, which operate as blind economic laws behind his back.”8 
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With Kantian philosophy, the characteristics of essence reappear within both the categories 
and the transcendental Ideas. Thus, reason becomes “the locus of the final unity, totality, and 
universality of knowledge: ‘the faculty that unifies the rules of the understanding under 
principles.’”9 Now, the “question of realizing the essence in existence” becomes “the problem 
of the transition from the concepts of theoretical to those of practical reason.”10 In other words, 
reason is the sphere within which such a realization becomes possible. Moreover, because Kant 
stipulates that “man’s free reason” must be at one with  
the empirical world of necessity, freedom is hypostasized as a timeless occurrence: it 
can exercise its causality on the empirical world only insofar as the world has no effect 
whatsoever on it. Free reason is limited in function to furnishing the determining 
ground of actions, to ‘beginning’ them. Once begun, actions enter the unbreakable 
causal nexus of natural necessity, and they proceed in accordance with its laws forever 
after.11 
Marcuse does not blame Kant and Descartes for the ways in which they limit human freedom 
to what one can cognize and think, thereby removing human freedom from the empirical, 
public world. In fact, he argues that the Kantian and Cartesian philosophical doctrines of 
essence mirror “the fate of a world in which rational human freedom always can take only the 
initial step freely, only to encounter afterward an uncontrolled necessity which remains 
contingent with respect to reason.”12 In other words, the fact that they limit human freedom in 
their philosophy correctly describes the experience of the individual in the world, as a sort of 
immanent (non)critique. This ‘uncontrolled necessity’ is not only the epistemological necessity 
of the categories and perception but also the necessity of participation in the economic relations 
that characterize bourgeois society. The individual’s behaviour, and the realm of possible 
actions and decisions he can undertake, “are prescribed him by the conditions of a commodity-
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producing society, and he must observe them if he does not want to go under.”13 Thus, even in 
this early stage of the bourgeois era, the reality is setting in that, in this society, the economic 
forces that the people have produced are coming to increasingly control the populace. 
With the advent of the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment, essence loses even more of 
its connection to external freedom. Marcuse notes that, at this point, the possibilities of 
authoritarian and totalitarian domination reveal themselves. The concept of essence loses its 
‘free’ character, as the thinking individual’s “critical freedom” is bound to “pregiven, 
unconditionally valid necessities,” and the concept of essence is no longer characterized by 
freedom and ‘spontaneity,’ but by “the receptivity of the intuition. Cognition culminates in 
recognition, where it remains fixated.”14 Then, in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries, phenomenology attempts to “reinvigorate bourgeois theory with the basic forces and 
concepts of German Idealism,” but “material eidetics,” following Husserl, have set in motion 
“the transition to a new stage: the preparation of thought for the ideology of authoritarian forms 
of domination.”15 Thus, from the beginning of the bourgeois era through to modern eidetics, 
“the concept of essence has followed a course leading from autonomy to heteronomy, from the 
proclamation of the free, rational individual to his surrender to the powers of the authoritarian 
state.”16 Finally, positivism launches an attack on metaphysics and its concept of essence. 
However, the positivist critique will become an ideological, ‘essential’ position, too, insofar as 
the basis of the critique lies within “its concept of fact,” and, with this concept, “the facticity 
of an object of knowledge establishes … its ‘reality’ … [and] its cognitive equi-valence to 
every other reality.”17 And here we have essence as a factual description of reality: “the thesis 
of the essentiality of the facts is associated with absolute knowledge of reality, ‘which is always 
essence’ [quoting from Mortiz Schlick, the father of positivism]. Cognition, freed from the 
tension between facts and essence, becomes recognition.”18 Marcuse notes that the world that 
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positivism claims is the only real world—the world that we ‘recognize’ rather than cognize—
is “dominated by powers concerned with the preservation of this form of reality, in the interest 
of small and powerful economic groups, against the already real possibility of another form of 
reality.”19 With this final manifestation of the concept of essence, i.e., the positivistic one, 
“both the ‘interest of freedom’ and interest in the true happiness of the individual have 
disappeared,” and those groups that are now dominant in society, who “developed and 
supported these interests” while their power grew, “oppose them under present forms of 
domination.”20 Such is the state of affairs in the traditional understanding of the concept of 
essence: no longer free, the human individual is subject to domination in and through his 
essential characteristics—inasmuch as these characteristics are described by the traditional 
understanding. 
Despite the proponents of the traditional concept of essence becoming increasingly cozy with 
authoritarianism, a counter-trend emerges in the Hegelian understanding of essence and 
appearance and the tension between them. Hegel’s thought is dialectical, and he understands 
essence as a process of overcoming in history. Essence is, therefore, a movement from “bad 
immediacy” toward “positing the sphere of beings … as that which it is in itself.”21 In other 
words, Hegel’s concept of essence is of a “process in which ‘mediated being’ is posited through 
the overcoming of unmediated being; essence has a history. … Essence is conceived as 
something which ‘has become,’ as a ‘result’ that itself must reappear as a result and that enters 
into relation with the dynamic categories of the inessential, illusion, and appearance.”22 For 
Marcuse, as well as for Marx, though, Hegel’s concept of essence stops short of its potential 
insofar as the movement that he describes is not concerned with any individual human or 
humanity itself; rather, the movement is ontological, and “it is the Being of beings which 
undergoes it and is its subject. … Man participates in this process only as the subject of 
cognition, insofar as he himself is rational Being.”23 Thus, Hegel’s concept of essence, which 
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is this process and tension between potentiality and actuality, essence and appearance, is 
transcendental and “always prior to all states of fact.”24 Although Hegel’s concept of essence 
is not sufficiently human-focused for Marcuse, his influence on materialist social theory is 
critical because of his centring of the historical dimension of essence. 
Essence is the process of the actualization of potentiality. The relation between essence and 
appearance, as understood by materialist theory, is “a historical disproportion[.] … On the 
basis of this theory the essence of man is understood in connection with those tendencies which 
have as their goal a new form of social life as the ‘Idea’ of that which practice must realize.”25 
That is, the potentialities—of what could be and what could have been—that exist in the 
essence of man inform appearance. Materialist theory, typified by Marx’s thought, understands 
the given facts “as appearances whose essence can be comprehended only in the context of 
particular historical tendencies aiming at a different form of reality,”26 and these facts, when 
compared with their potentialities, “reveal themselves to be the ‘bad’ manifestations of a 
content which must be realized by doing away with these manifestations in opposition to the 
interests and powers connected with them.”27 So, whereas Hegel’s theory centres Being and 
ontologizes the movement from potentiality to actuality, materialist theory centres humanity 
and concerns itself with human subjects. Marcuse writes that, in order for the individual to 
“achieve the liberation of becoming himself,” humanity must “be freed from real need and real 
misery[.] … When the essence of man becomes the object of inquiry in this way, the relation 
of essence and appearance is posited as a historical disproportion,”28 as we saw above. And 
this disproportion is actualized in concrete terms, such as economic inequality, hunger, and 
other forms of oppression, in given historical contexts. At the current stage of development, 
“real potentialities for the fulfillment of human life are at hand in all areas, potentialities which 
are not realized in the present social structure,” thus, we have a “precise meaning” for “the 
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concept of what could be, of inherent possibilities.”29 Specifically, Marcuse writes that there 
are several factors that determine what we can be in any given historical moment: “the measure 
of control of natural and social productive forces, the level of the organization of labor, the 
development of needs in relation to possibilities for their fulfillment[,] … the availability, as 
material to be appropriated, of a wealth of cultural values in all areas of life.”30 Thus, we can 
better understand the meaning of essence, and we can better understand what it is to be human, 
that is, “not only what can already be made of man today, what ‘in itself’ can already be today, 
but also … the real fulfillment of everything that man desires to be when he understands 
himself in terms of his potentialities.”31 Social theory, therefore, helps us understand what the 
meaning of the human individual’s essence is: the form he can embody once he understands 
himself in terms of his potentialities and desires the fulfillment of this form.  
However, ‘embodiment’ does not mean that the form is static or transcendental. Rather, 
essence “as process always remains indeterminate to the extent that [it] always depends on the 
possibility inherent in a given state, [which] is always produced through the interaction of the 
various elements that define necessarily contingent social and historical moments.”32 There is 
no total or final realization of human essence; instead, we must affirm the historical and 
contingent character of essence, which is “simply to recognize that there is no affirmation of 
the essential that assumes an eternal form.”33 In his review of Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts, 
Marcuse writes that “[e]ssence and existence separate in [the individual]: his existence is a 
‘means’ to the realization of his essence, or—in estrangement—his essence is a means to his 
mere physical existence.”34 When this separation of existence and essence occurs, and “if the 
real and free task of human praxis is the unification of both as factual realization, then the 
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of estranged labour is a necessity, is the authentic task, because capitalism is characterized by 
“a catastrophe affecting the human essence.”36 Kellner writes that Marcuse, in his review of 
the Manuscripts, locates the ground and justification for revolution in “the contradiction 
between one’s essential human needs and powers and the historical conditions of capitalist 
society. … [T]his contradiction involves the opposition between free, many-sided creative 
activity and alienated labour.”37 And Holman writes that the “primary way in which [the 
individual] expresses her intrinsic creativity, is through participation in processes of 
(nonalienated) labour, which Marcuse describes as ‘the free and full realization of the whole 
man in his historical world.’”38 So, for Marx and Marcuse, labour is bound up with both 
essence and freedom. 
Marcuse sees labour as the possibility of an activity that enacts the creative potential of human 
essence, which is simultaneously an expression of human freedom. Holman writes that 
Marcuse’s concept of labour is not economic but ontological, that it is the “general form of 
creativity, the faculty that generates the movement from existent to potentiality.”39 He goes on 
to explain that Marcuse, drawing from Hegel, argues that through labour “one becomes a 
being-for-self,” that labour is “a form of creative self-objectification by which one makes 
oneself permanent in the objective world.”40 It is important to note that ‘objectification’ in this 
context is the human ability to create freely; that is, labouring is “continually work[ing] upon 
and consciously alter[ing] not only the world but one’s essence as well. … For Marcuse the 
essence of labour lies not simply in self-expression but in the creative overcoming of subjective 
and objective reality.”41 Labour allows for the manifestation of essence and, simultaneously, 
self-overcoming through self-objectification in the world via creative expression. Beyond that, 
though, it also resembles the human essence, and it functions as a sort of external manifestation 
of that essence. Holman writes that labour is defined by “its process character. The continuous 
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task of labour is the creation of a future world through an overcoming and transformation of 
the past. Because the content of this future world can never be fixed once and for all, labour is 
forever an indeterminate historical practice, persistently altering the nature of both the 
objective world and the subject.”42 Much like Marcuse’s description of essence as historical, 
that is, as the process of overcoming through the inherent possibilities for the future and the 
actualization of these possibilities, labour is indeterminate and its task is creating a world 
through an overcoming of the past. 
Whereas Holman places a lot of emphasis on the concept of labour that Marcuse develops in 
his review of Marx’s Manuscripts, Kellner criticizes this early concept because it ontologizes 
labour. Kellner argues that we can see in the review “some of the weaknesses of Marcuse’s 
early problematic before his work with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research,” because of 
his “excessive ontological generalization.”43 The generalization in this essay lies in his “claim 
that labour follows ‘the law of the object’ and that it therefore inevitably contains 
‘externalization’ and ‘alienation’, and is ontologically a ‘burden’. The analysis is faulty 
because it eternalizes alienation and does not allow for creative, non-alienated labour.”44 Thus, 
Marcuse seems to ascribe characteristics of capitalist wage-labour to his ostensibly universal, 
ontological concept of labour; however, he departs from this sort of analysis later in his career, 
as his style moves more toward immanent critique. Moreover, following Marx in Capital III, 
Marcuse “excludes labour from the realm of freedom and authentic individuality by … 
severing human activity into … a realm of freedom which contains possibilities for creation of 
an authentic self, and a realm of necessity in which labour is in bondage to the domain of 
material production.”45 On this point, though, Holman agrees with Kellner, and he argues that 
we should criticize this exclusion. Marx argues that, even in a world in which labour is no 
longer alienated and is therefore “intrinsically gratifying, … the fact remains that the activities 
[i.e., labour and activities for the satisfaction of need] are undertaken in the service of ends 
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external to themselves.”46 Holman writes that, while Marcuse’s review of the Manuscripts is 
crucial insofar as it contains the most in-depth exploration of labour and essence, he limits the 
possibilities that labour presents.47  
Marcuse will eventually go beyond this interpretation, which bifurcates the sphere of human 
activity into one realm of freedom and another of necessity. Holman writes that Marcuse’s 
rejection of this distinction “allows for the possibility of thinking of all spheres of human 
existence as potentially functioning as media for the expression of the human essence. Just as 
Marcuse will eventually interpret even socially necessary labour as a form of play,” politics, 
too, will “eventually be able to be seen as an intrinsically gratifying and self-affirming activity 
that nevertheless also looks toward an externality: not the production of use-values, but rather 
of new institutional forms.”48 Marcuse does not describe or outline these new forms, but he 
does describe the future that social theory aims to create. He writes of a society that “disposes 
of the goods available to it in such a way that they are distributed in accordance with the true 
needs of the community.”49 However, one cannot reach these ideas only through 
philosophizing and contemplating the evidence of “mere perception,” nor can one reach them 
through “a universal system of values in which [these ideas] are anchored.”50 Rather, the model 
of essence that social theory posits “is preserved better in human misery and suffering and the 
struggle to overcome them than in the forms and concepts of pure thought. This truth is 
‘indeterminate,’” and while we continue to measure it “against the idea of unconditionally 
certain knowledge,” it will always be indeterminate, because “it is fulfilled only through 
historical action.”51 Ironic though it may be, Marcuse goes on to describe—in abstract, 
philosophical terms—materialist theory’s dialectical concepts: they are able to “transcend the 
given social reality in the direction of another historical structure which is present as a tendency 
in the given reality,” and the concept of essence “is rooted in this potential structure. In terms 
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of the positive concept of essence, all categories that describe the given form of existence as 
historically mutable become ‘ironic’: they contain their own negation.”52 Thus, this potential 
future is available in the present, as a sort of ‘negation-in-waiting.’ The given, unfree form of 
existence has within it a possible future form of free existence that is not yet given: we must 
take it, enact it, through historical practice and action. What remains is to decipher the means 
and methods for beginning this process. 
Freedom is connected with becoming, potentiality, and labour, all of which are in turn bound 
up with essence. We know that Marcuse decries the bourgeois notion of freedom, which arises 
in the context of the bourgeois era’s concept of essence: freedom recedes from the material 
world, and now the individual finds his freedom internally, in the ego cogito. The world in 
which the individual finds himself “becomes a merely ‘external’ world that is not rationally 
connected with man’s authentic potential, his ‘substance’ or ‘essence.’”53 The individual turns 
inward, because that is where his freedom lies. The external world is uncertain and unfree, 
which “is countered by the certainty and freedom of thought as the individual’s only remaining 
power base.”54 In bourgeois philosophy, essence becomes part and parcel of the individual’s 
rational faculty “as that which is essential in man.”55 However, when freedom is found only in 
reason, “whole dimensions of existence become ‘inessential,’ of no bearing on man’s 
essence.”56 Freedom, therefore, must not be merely internal, merely rational; there must be 
some form of social organization that can fulfill the individual’s desire and need for freedom. 
The interests of materialist theory “aim at an organization of life in which the individual’s fate 
depends no longer on chance and the blind necessity of uncontrolled economic relationships 
but rather on planned shaping of social potentialities. … [The] material conditions of life … 
can be organized through and by individuals’ social freedom; that is, they can be linked to the 
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‘essence’ of the individual.”57 Later in his career, Marcuse will further develop the connection 
between essence and freedom that he describes in this early essay. 
The connection between essence and freedom lies in the tension between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ that 
Marcuse discusses at great length in One-Dimensional Man. The tension between essence and 
appearance, potentiality and actuality, is and ought, “permeates the two-dimensional universe 
of discourse which is the universe of critical, abstract thought,” and dialectical thought 
develops the contradictions between the two dimensions, thereby understanding the 
contradictions and the mediations between them as “historical process. Thus the ‘other’ 
dimension of thought appeared to be historical dimension—the potentiality as historical 
possibility, its realization as historical event.”58 Freedom must activate and integrate the 
becoming-structure of human essence; that is, it must incorporate the perpetual change and 
indeterminacy of human life. For a society to be free, its members must have both internal and 
external freedom; they must not be limited by external factors such as the economic, political, 
racist, sexist, or other oppressive and repressive forms of social containment (such as those we 
examined in the first chapter).  
Marcuse has clearly argued against the internal freedom described by the bourgeois 
philosophy, and he does not want to limit the freedom of the individual to the private sphere. 
However, he acknowledges that the individual must be free internally and in the privacy of 
one’s own home in order to be free in the public sphere. In Eros and Civilization: “human 
freedom is not only a private affair—but it is nothing at all unless it is also a private affair.”59 
And again in One-Dimensional Man: The distinction between the public and private individual 
has collapsed, and the private space of the individual “has been invaded and whittled down by 
technological reality. Mass production and mass distribution claim the entire individual[.] … 
The result is, not adjustment but mimesis: an immediate identification of the individual with 
his society and, through it, with the society as a whole.”60 Thus, public unfreedom, which 
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allowed for the growth of the private, internally free rational subject, has now spread to the 
private sphere. Marcuse asks whether the established society, where the individual is not even 
free in his own home, can “rightfully claim that it respects the individual and that it is a free 
society? To be sure, a free society is defined by more, and by more fundamental achievements, 
than private autonomy. And yet, the absence of the latter vitiates even the most conspicuous 
institutions of economic and political freedom—by denying freedom at its hidden roots.”61 
Everywhere unfree, rudderless, what hope is there for one-dimensional man?  
2.2 Born Again (for the Very First Time) 
Throughout her career, Hannah Arendt aimed to produce a rigorous theory of action, which 
she believed is the highest form of public living that humans can undertake. Her text, The 
Human Condition, deals with the tripartite division of the vita activa: labour, which revolves 
around the maintenance of life and objects of consumption; work, which produces use-objects 
and the physical structures that allow for the durability of the human world; and action, which 
involves speech and praxis and is the only part of the vita activa that “goes on directly between 
men without the intermediary of things or matter.”62 Whereas Human Condition analyses the 
vita activa, Arendt’s unfinished, final text, The Life of the Mind, deals with the vita 
contemplativa, which has its own tripartite division: thinking, willing, and judging. Despite 
Arendt’s focus on the mind in this latter text, willing and its faculty, i.e., the will, reveals itself 
to be deeply connected with the possibilities of action in the appearing world. Through an 
analysis of the will and its spontaneity, Arendt’s concept of action in the public realm becomes 
a powerful tool for political action in the contemporary era.  
The will is a faculty of the mind, an inner domain, and it requires a withdrawal from the world. 
However, this withdrawal is only temporary, as the willing ego has “the intention of a later 
return,” because its objects “are particulars with an established home in the appearing world.”63 
Because of its unique connection to the appearing world, the withdrawal phase of the will “is 
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characterized by the strongest form of reflexivity [of the mind’s faculties], an acting back upon 
itself.”64 This connection differs from that of the thinking ego, which deals with ‘de-sensed’ 
objects that the mind represents through the power of memory and imagination. The will is 
“our mental organ for the future,” just as “memory is our mental organ for the past,” and it 
deals with “things, visible and invisibles, that have never existed at all,”65 unlike thought-
objects, which are re-presented through memory. Thus, rather than looking backward, as the 
mind does in remembrance, the willing ego looks toward the future, and it approaches those 
things that we can change or choose to do, but “whose accomplishment is by no means 
certain,”66 because of the indeterminacy of the future.  
Arendt calls the objects of the will ‘projects,’ due to the uncertainty of their accomplishment. 
It is only in looking backward, post hoc, that this uncertainty can become certainty and “a 
freely performed act loses its air of contingency under the impact of now being an 
accomplished fact[;] … the act appears to us now in the guise of necessity.”67 The willing ego 
thus approaches the fundamental uncertainty that characterizes the future with the goal of 
uniting its present ‘I-will’ or ‘I-can’ with its projected ‘I-do’ or ‘I-have-done’; that is, “when 
willing-something will have changed into doing-it.”68 The projected I-do of the will is the 
affirmative, present-tense form of “I-will-and-I-can,” which Arendt calls “the Will’s 
delight.”69 However, prior to the fulfillment of the will’s project, its “normal mood” is 
“impatience, disquiet, and worry,”70 because the willing ego fears that the I-will might become 
an I-will-and-I-cannot. (Below, I address this fear, insofar as it characterizes the early 
Christians’ reversal of the notion of freedom, which is crucial for our understanding of the 
particular form of freedom that Arendt embraces and encourages.) In short, the will is the 
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faculty of the mind that envisions the possibilities that the future may present to the self, and, 
in envisioning this future, it projects itself toward doing or having done any number of things. 
The ways in which the will projects itself into the future beg the questions of what willing is 
and whether or not the will freely chooses its projects. This is a binary question for Arendt: 
“The will is either an organ of free spontaneity that interrupts all causal chains of motivation 
that would bind it or it is nothing but an illusion.”71 Despite the force of this either/or, in the 
final analysis, her answer is not so clear. Arendt’s notion of the will and its freedom is quite 
ambiguous, as it changes throughout her career; at some points she appears to be completely 
opposed to the idea of the will, while at others she appears to endorse it. This ambiguity results 
from Arendt’s attempts to position herself, on the one hand, in opposition to the will and its 
freedom as understood by the philosophical and political traditions, and, on the other hand, in 
favour of the will as a free, spontaneous faculty of the mind, which is not itself political but 
which prepares the self for action. What follows is an overview of her first, more famous 
conception of the will, which is primarily negative. In this conception, she excoriates the 
traditional understanding of the freedom of the will and its connection to the notion of political 
sovereignty. After this overview, I discuss the new understanding of the will that Arendt 
develops in Life of the Mind, through an exploration of her concept of natality. 
In her essay, “What is Freedom?,” Arendt mounts a strong critique of the will, but her aim is 
“not to fully discredit” it; rather, since she locates the origins of the willing faculty in the early 
Christians’ withdrawal from politics and the public realm, she aims to “confine it to the realm 
of philosophical freedom, the freedom of the mind.”72 This is not to say that Arendt believes, 
like Descartes and Kant, that freedom properly speaking cannot exist in the public sphere. 
Instead, her point is that public freedom is not to be found in the will, despite the fact of the 
popular understanding of the ‘freedom of the will’ as that public freedom which must be 
protected against encroachment from authority.  
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Through an historical account of the idea of the will and its freedom, Arendt aims to shrink the 
space of manifestation for the will in the public sphere. The Christian idea of an inner sense of 
freedom, located in the willing faculty of the mind, does not arise from an experience of the 
strength of the will and its freedom. Arendt argues instead that the will’s impotence, “the 
experience of an I-will-and-cannot,”73 is the source of the sense of inner freedom, of freedom’s 
internalization. Freedom only truly exists “where the I-will and the I-can coincide.”74 If one 
were unable to do what one willed, then one would be subject to necessity, which “may arise 
from the world, or from my own body, or from an insufficiency of talents, gifts, and qualities 
which are bestowed upon man by birth[;] … all these factors … condition the person from the 
outside as far as the I-will and the I-know … are concerned.”75 Arendt contends that the origin 
of the common understanding of the will is connected with the separation between freedom 
and politics that Christianity has engendered: “the early Christians, and especially Paul, 
discovered a kind of freedom which had no relation to politics, … occurring in the intercourse 
between me and myself, and outside of the intercourse between men. Free will and freedom 
became synonymous notions, and the presence of freedom was experienced in complete 
solitude.”76 The notion of the ‘free will’ as a faculty of the mind arose within the early Christian 
experience of public impotence and lack of freedom, so that the Christian concepts of freedom 
and free will revolve around sovereignty, “the ideal of a free will, independent from others.”77 
This is a departure from the notion of freedom present in Greek antiquity, which was a state of 
being manifested in action and was explicitly political; for, according to Arendt, the polis was 
a place of action, and “to be free and to act are the same.”78 Arendt traces the transformations 
of the mode of freedom adopted by the early Christians through the philosophical tradition, 
and she discovers that freedom has been displaced from its original domain, the realm of 
politics, to the inner realm of the mind.  
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Modernity is characterized by a separation of politics and freedom, which was brought about 
in large part by the political thinkers of the Enlightenment. Here we see a similarity between 
Arendt’s understanding of the concept of freedom’s trajectory throughout the bourgeois period 
and that of Marcuse. This separation typifies the common understanding of ‘freedom,’ which 
becomes relatively synonymous with sovereignty and becomes “a marginal phenomenon—
which somehow forms the boundary government should not overstep unless life itself and its 
immediate interests and necessities are at stake.”79 This boundary exists because, in the modern 
age, “government” has “been identified with the total domain of the political” and is 
“considered to be the appointed protector not so much of freedom as of the life process, the 
interests of society and its individuals.”80 Andreas Kalyvas’ interpretation of Arendt’s writings 
about sovereignty, from Human Condition through On Revolution, is a crucial addition to the 
literature on the subject. In her early writings, Arendt indicts sovereignty’s role in conjuring 
up “the practices of command and coercion, separating the ruler from the ruled and imposing 
a vertical and inegalitarian model of government”81; meanwhile, in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, Arendt describes the ways in which sovereignty levels the plurality of the 
public sphere “by homogenizing and annihilating all differences and distinctions in the name 
of ‘One Man of gigantic proportions.’”82 These theoretical analyses of the impact of 
sovereignty on the public sphere and plurality characterize Arendt’s writings.  
In On Revolution, Arendt denounces the concept of the sovereign ‘will of the people,’ 
describing it as a major factor in undermining the cause of the French Revolution. Kalyvas 
writes that the sovereign popular will’s “shaky and volatile nature was totally antithetical to 
order and stability. As the sovereign can never limit itself, similarly it can never establish an 
enduring constitutional order. … Unregulated and faced with no limitation, unshaped and 
boundless, the sovereign decision became vulnerable to its own transient and fluid dispositions 
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to plunge finally into terror.”83 The infamous Terror of the 1790s in France grew out of the 
notion of the sovereign popular will, as the idea of sovereignty relies on “postulating an 
‘Other,’ an enemy” in order to consolidate itself as “indivisible.”84 Therefore, Kalyvas writes, 
the popular will penalizes and incriminates “plurality and differences so that, on the one hand, 
they are perceived as real, concrete threats[,] … and on the other, they are rationalized as 
necessary symbolic referents … deployed to solidify the unity of the body politic by steering 
it away from any form of dissent and disagreement.”85 The revolutionaries’ discovery of the 
unifying and homogenizing force of the postulation of an Other developed, and they extended 
“this oppositional logic to its ultimate consequences [and] discovered that the enemy could 
well be within each apparently virtuous citizen.”86 Thus, we can understand the Terror of 1793–
94 as another form of the terrorism that the revolutionaries had initially identified with the 
monarchy. Robespierre’s legitimation of the Terror—despite its resemblance to the despotism 
against which he claims to fight—can be seen as a recognition of this reversal and 
incorporation, which he attempts to explain away in the same manner that reactionaries tend 
to do, such as the Nazis’ adoption of the practices described in the Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion.87 Barry Goldwater’s defense of “extremism” and opposition to “moderation” fits the 
same mold.88 One recognizes that people might see what one does as simply a repetition of 
that against which one fights, but says in response: ‘No, when we do it, it is good; for we know 
who our Enemy is, and we know that we are good.’ We can see a similarity here between this 
understanding of the Other within each citizen, who must be opposed and destroyed, and 
Marcuse’s description of the external Enemy that the system incorporates into itself, which we 
described in the first chapter. The introduction of the freedom of the will into politics 
transforms it into the idea of popular sovereignty, which grants to the people the monarch’s 
decision-making strength.  
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Arendt locates the source of many modern tragedies in this traditional understanding of 
freedom as free will and sovereignty. The “philosophical equation of freedom and free will … 
leads either to a denial of freedom—namely, if it is realized that whatever men may be, they 
are never sovereign—or to the insight that the freedom of one man, or a group, or a body politic 
can be purchased only at the price of the freedom … of all others.”89 The philosophical tradition 
inaugurated by Platonic philosophy abhors the freedom of action because of the ways in which 
it “seems to entangle its producer” in the unintended and unforeseen consequences of every 
act.90 The freedom of action seems to force the actor “to forfeit his freedom the very moment 
he makes use of it,” because he becomes responsible for consequences of which he had no 
foresight.91 Therefore, the philosophical tradition shifts “from action to will-power, from 
freedom as a state of being manifest in action to the liberum arbitrium [the freedom to choose 
between two given options],”92 which is the freedom of the will understood in the Christian 
sense: a will that is negatively free (i.e. ‘free from’ external influence, rather than ‘free to’ act) 
or sovereign.  
During the Enlightenment, political philosophers such as Rousseau infuse political freedom 
with the philosophical understanding of freedom as the freedom of the will, thereby pushing 
sovereignty to the forefront of the popular conceptions of political freedom. Rousseau’s 
political philosophy, which espouses the sovereignty of the body politic and the individual, 
relies on the conception of “political power in the strict image of individual will-power.”93 
Against Rousseau, Arendt argues that a “community actually founded on this sovereign will 
would be built not on sand but on quicksand.”94 Instead, plurality, “the fact that not man but 
men live on the earth,” means that “freedom and sovereignty are so little identical that they 
cannot even exist simultaneously. … If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they 
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must renounce.”95 Because of the illusory character of this understanding of freedom—as the 
sovereignty that the tradition associates with freedom—it can only be maintained “by the 
instruments of violence, that is, with essentially non-political means.”96 Furthermore, as 
Holman writes, because humans always inhabit the world plurally, “sovereignty remains an 
illusion. … The problem with sovereignty is that for the power that is generated between 
individuals, it substitutes the power of one individual or a group of individuals over all 
others.”97 To Arendt, the source of much of the modern age’s revolutionary and state violence 
is the equation of free will and freedom, which we retain to this day. Even if we were to grant 
that a successful revolution requires revolutionary violence, it would not follow logically, by 
necessity, that the French Revolution was successful, unless the only benchmark of success is 
the overthrow of the ancient regime. The new constitution of 1791, crafted in the first phases 
of the revolution, was made essentially impotent by the first Assembly because of 
Robespierre’s self-denying ordinance. What followed was several years of war, political (and 
non-political) executions and massacres of ‘counter-revolutionaries’ (in scare quotes because 
of the constantly shifting definition of the term), massive inflation, and suffering. Then, the 
arguably terrible Directory, which ushered in the Napoleon dictatorship, and, thus, more war.98 
By the revolutionaries’ own definition(s), it is hard to describe this as a successful revolution. 
Again, it may be the case that a successful revolution does require revolutionary terror or 
violence, but it is not clear that the Terror of 1793–94 was necessary.  
The crises of the contemporary era can be traced to the popular notion of sovereignty, or the 
will of the people. As I discuss further below, the transposition of the will’s qualities to the 
political sphere, the world of human affairs, has led to an all-too common backlash against 
action of the sort that we must undertake to combat the crises. Across the globe, reactionary 
politicians and groups of people have obstructed attempts to curb carbon emissions, address 
economic inequalities, and fix discriminatory governmental and corporate policies. Although 
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I cannot address it here, it is important to note that, in some cases, it appears as though the 
economically and socially powerful in society weaponize cultural animus via propaganda to 
exploit people’s naivety, while in other cases, rather than naivety, it seems that cynicism and 
atomization—issues that Arendt deals with in Origins of Totalitarianism—have taken hold of 
populations and politicians. The propaganda latches onto the naivety and cynicism and 
misdirects the populace toward other, false crises, some of which the propagandists themselves 
invent, and some of which they merely amplify, such as the QAnon conspiracy theory and its 
subsidiaries. However, in each case, there is overwhelming paralysis and stasis in the face of 
these mounting global crises, and we are not confronting the dilemmas that we face. This 
inaction can be explained at least in part by the equation of the free will with sovereignty in 
the world of human affairs; for, while the will produces the possibility of action, it is also 
characterized by an erratic temperament that can lead to paralysis.99 In order to investigate 
potential solutions to these issues, i.e., the issues of the common notion of the ‘will of the 
people’ and global inaction in the face of the crises of the contemporary era, we must discuss 
Arendt’s concept of natality, insofar as it relates to the will, and its role in preparing the self 
and the mind for action. 
The concept of natality revolves around the human individual’s capacity to ‘begin’; that is, the 
ability to start something new by introducing unprecedented acts, objects, and events into the 
world. Following St. Augustine, Arendt argues that we have the capacity to begin because we 
are ourselves a beginning: “Man does not possess freedom so much as he, or better his coming 
into the world, is equated with the appearance of freedom in the universe[.] … Because he is a 
beginning, man can begin; to be human and to be free are one and the same. God created man 
in order to introduce into the world the faculty of beginning: freedom.”100 The capacity to 
begin, human natality, is part and parcel of what it means to be free, which is itself part of the 
essential structure of what it means to be human. And so, much like Marcuse’s concept of 
essence as becoming and creation, for Arendt, “the human being is thus that being whose 
essence it is to begin or create.”101 Patricia Bowen-Moore divides natality into three categories: 
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primary natality, political natality, and tertiary natality. Primary natality is the individual’s 
factual birth (i.e., the birth of the person) and the power to begin, which are two sides of the 
same coin, and the experience of primary natality “characterises the pre-political status of 
human birth and human beginnings.”102 Political natality “constitutes man’s ‘second birth,’” 
which is a birth into the world of politics.103 Tertiary natality corresponds to the mind’s 
capacity for beginning within the context of thinking, willing, and judging: it “identifies the 
re-construction of the theoretical life from the aspect of its nascence.”104 For our purposes here, 
tertiary natality is the key component of Bowen-Moore’s schema, but in order to properly 
outline the ways in which tertiary natality functions with respect to action, I must briefly 
discuss the other two natalities because each relates to the others in important ways. 
As a concept, primary natality regards the birth of each individual human being as an 
unprecedented “miracle,”105 which produces the individual’s freedom to act. As a beginning, 
each birth is unprecedented, because each human enters into a world that is always anterior to 
the appearance of this absolutely new individual, and this novelty is unprecedented in the 
already-existing world.106 The fact that the individual can begin something new, as a 
‘beginner,’ is “conditioned by and dependent upon the possession of a principle for beginning. 
This is his natality, his supreme capacity for beginning.”107 The human being is a beginning 
insofar as his birth is a beginning, and, by virtue of his being a beginning, he is also a beginner: 
“The beginner’s factual birth is, as it were, the installation of his capacity to initiate.”108 Before 
the individual’s ‘second birth,’ this capacity to initiate is pre-political, but it produces the 
possibility of action; without it, “he could not exercise action of any sort. … Human natality, 
as the pre-condition for the exercise of action, anchors the beginner’s potentiality for action of 
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a political sort and so, ultimately, freedom.”109 Primary natality thus refers to the individual’s 
inherent, structural capacity to begin, as Bowen-Moore writes that the individual’s “intrinsic 
principle for novelty which belongs to him as part of his essential structure” grants him the 
capacity for action.110 In the fact of his birth, which is his beginning, the individual himself 
begins; that is, his unprecedented beginning is his first act as a beginner, and this first act 
“establishes the condition for further beginnings as possible to it.”111 The concept of primary 
natality describes the individual’s initiatory capacity; crucially, this capacity is an essential part 
of what it is to be human. Each human being is a beginner and, therefore, can begin. By dint 
of his being at all, each human has at his origin his first act as a beginner, namely, his birth, 
and this first act initiates the ability to act and initiate subsequent beginnings. 
Factual birth, which is each person’s first ‘act,’ is followed by his second birth—into the 
publicity of the realm of human affairs. This second birth is the way in which the beginner 
“commences action in the public world of human affairs[,] … the field of political freedom 
wherein the actor has the opportunity to individuate himself, his uniqueness, through 
distinctive words and deeds.”112 The world of human affairs, which exists before the 
individual’s birth and will continue to exist after his death, is the locus of individuation 
because, insofar as human affairs are political, the world of human affairs is conditioned by 
plurality. Individuation requires plurality; we are unique and distinct by virtue of “the fact that 
not man but men live on the earth.”113 Distinctiveness requires contrast, and it is through this 
comparison that we can distinguish ourselves. The experience of plurality “corresponds to the 
fact that human beings are born into a world inhabited by others and to the fact that they have 
the power to form a community of actors.”114 Insofar as the world of human affairs is the realm 
of politics and, therefore, of freedom, plurality guarantees the reality of freedom; for Arendt, 
freedom is “entirely political,” and its “reality is dependent upon the condition of human 
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plurality for its appearance.”115 Freedom is the capacity to “call something into being,” in the 
world of human affairs, “which did not exist before.”116 Secondary, political natality, then, is 
our birth into the world of human affairs, which is characterized by plurality; within the realm 
of politics, we may enact our capacity to begin something completely new and unprecedented. 
Tertiary natality differs from primary and political natality insofar as it centres on the capacities 
of the mind. Bowen-Moore investigates thinking, willing, and judging, but our focus here is 
only on willing and judging. Although Arendt’s understanding of freedom is distinct from her 
understanding of the will, the two are closely related, because “freedom and its experience of 
spontaneity are the will’s supreme and most far-reaching extension. Hence, the will and the 
experience of freedom share the condition of natality.”117 Bowen-Moore outlines the influence 
that Arendt draws from Augustine’s and Duns Scotus’ conceptions of the will and, in Life of 
the Mind, Arendt explores the ideas of these two Christian thinkers. Bowen-Moore writes that 
Augustine understands the will to be a source of action rather than a dictatorial presence in the 
mind, and Arendt adopts this understanding. The will  
is not freedom but a precondition of freedom: it prepares action and is the spring of 
action but itself is not action until its interior activity ceases. The will … anticipate[s] 
freedom insofar as it holds steadfast to its inherent erratic temperament and its 
autonomy as a power for beginning. … [It] anticipates the experience of contingency 
behind every act of an I-will and it is able to live with action’s unpredictability prior to 
its rupture in history as an event already having been enacted.118  
The will is able to begin new things, to embark upon new projects, because of its condition of 
natality; however, unlike political natality, which is manifested in action, willing is an internal 
capacity of the mind. Therefore, the natality of the will prepares the individual for action—in 
all of its indeterminateness and unpredictability—as the spring of action.  
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The contingency of the willing faculty, of the I-will, is a crucial element of Arendt’s concept, 
which she incorporates from the philosophy of Duns Scotus. He “did not denigrate the idea of 
contingency but rather regarded it as a spontaneous beginning of something which cannot be 
predicted but which, once having occurred, could have been replaced by its opposite.”119 Just 
as it is for action, contingency is an essential part of willing, because both activities throw 
themselves and their agent into the indeterminate and unpredictable possibilities of the future. 
Action occurs in the present and its objects exist within the current world, but the consequences 
of every act can and do reverberate, perhaps, forever.120 Meanwhile, the will’s objects exist in 
the future, as projects; these futural objects are undetermined and subject to change, and, as 
projects, they are potential objects of action. In addition, the will “cannot be coerced to will 
one thing as if by some sort of necessity. … [Its] experience of the potentiality of freedom is 
guaranteed by the principle of contingency.”121 The freedom of the will lies in the spontaneity 
that accompanies its “causal contingency,” because of its freedom from coercion, and its 
“unpredictability,” because of the indeterminateness of the future where its projects lie.122 And 
this freedom of the will, Bowen-Moore writes, “endows [the mind] with a certain self-
confidence to act if it so wills. … [B]ut the inception of action is founded on the randomness 
of the contingent, the utter arbitrariness of beginnings.”123 The freedom of the will reveals itself 
in its spontaneity, its unpredictability, and its contingency; that is, by way of its tertiary natality, 
the willing faculty empowers the I-do of action by proclaiming I-can-and-I-will.  
Despite the apparent strength of the willing faculty, it is not the political faculty of the mind. 
Instead, judgment is the key mental faculty that interpolates mental life to the political sphere; 
the will’s “context is entirely interior” even though “its interests do indeed lie with the 
experience of action.”124 In the face of its freedom, its orientation toward the future’s 
unpredictability, and its own causal contingency, “the willing activity can betray its inherent 
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erratic behavior” by presenting the self with the opportunity to not will and to, instead, do 
nothing.125 Judgment, on the other hand, approaches the plurality of the world and the 
possibilities for action granted to the self by freedom. It is the most political activity of the 
mind because “it takes the plurality of the world into account when it makes its 
pronouncements. … [It] reinstates the thinker and the actor in history … due to the simple fact 
that those who witness words and deeds form a judgement about them which, in turn, becomes 
part of a worldly reality.”126 Internally, insofar as it is a mental faculty, judging “particularises 
the generalities of thinking and the performance of the will’s projects by withdrawing from 
these interests with a view to judging them impartially.”127 Simultaneously, Bowen-Moore 
writes, judging is characterized by its public context, and this publicity is “enhanced by the 
factor of impartiality,” which is “essential in the formation of a judgement because by way of 
this speciality the mind can acquire a ‘viewpoint from which to look upon, to watch, to form 
judgements … to reflect upon human affairs.’”128 The judging faculty is able to gain this 
impartial viewpoint due to its “special capacity: imagination,” which allows the individual “to 
imagine other people’s points of view and to compare one’s own judgement with the possible 
judgements of others by thinking from the other’s perspective.”129 Through the judging 
faculty’s reflection on the common world—the sphere of action and political affairs—it forms 
an impartial viewpoint from which to reflect on the possibilities of action that the will projects. 
Bowen-Moore writes that willing is “the spring of action whose potentiality is such that it can 
break into history through revelatory action and speech,” and that the “political product” of 
judging “is a meaningful story told to the mind about the common world in which we live and 
take our bearings.”130 From its impartial viewpoint, judgment tells this story to the mind, 
thereby contextualizing the will’s projects and particularizing them into possibilities for action; 
that is, possibilities of new and unprecedented acts. 
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The concept of the will that Arendt analyzes in Life of the Mind differs from her earlier, more 
critical conception of it. The critical lens through which she initially views the will, though, is 
not a dismissal of the will but an attempt to show its interiority and the unique experience of 
its freedom. The common notion of freedom as sovereignty arises out of the transposition of 
the distinctly internal freedom of the will from the mind to the world of human affairs, and 
Arendt argues that this has had disastrous consequences for humanity. In Life of the Mind, 
though, her concept of the will becomes more entangled with natality and freedom, as she 
claims that “[t]he freedom of spontaneity is part and parcel of the human condition. Its mental 
organ is the will.”131 Here, Arendt ties the freedom of spontaneity, in the context of the human 
condition, to the will in much more explicit terms than she does in “What is Freedom?,” where 
the will is understood in terms of—and criticized on the basis of—the Christian sense of the 
faculty. In Life of the Mind, Arendt writes of the influence of Epictetus’ philosophy on 
Christian ideas of the will: “the heart of the matter [for Epictetus’ thought] is the Will’s power 
to assent or dissent, say Yes or No insofar, at any rate, as I myself am concerned.”132 Kalyvas 
writes that, in Life of the Mind, Arendt moves away from the understanding of the willing 
faculty that she criticizes in “What is Freedom?,” toward the dual nature of the will, influenced 
by Kant, Duns Scotus, and Augustine, who transformed the idea of the will as liberum 
arbitrium and “reconceptualized it in terms of natality and the power to unpredictably start 
something new.”133 With this shift, the ambiguities of Arendt’s concept of the will arise once 
again. 
Kalyvas explores the possible reasons for Arendt’s newer conception of the will and focuses 
his attention on natality and the individual’s capacity to begin, which characterize humanity’s 
freedom. He argues that the similarities between freedom and willing must have become much 
more apparent to Arendt insofar as her newer, prolonged discussion and analysis of the will in 
Life of the Mind reveals the extent to which the will “is the faculty of the unexpected and the 
singular and the source of extraordinary events.”134 Kalyvas thus emphasizes the will’s 
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connection to natality much more than does Bowen-Moore. This emphasis is a much more 
forceful interpretation of Arendt’s concept, and his reflections on the potential strength of her 
concept of the will in relation to freedom and liberation represent a positive augmentation of 
the concept and make it more applicable and practicable in the contemporary era. 
The will’s futural orientation allows it to do its work within the inherent indeterminacy and 
unpredictability of the future. In fact, despite the will’s characteristic ‘disquiet,’ this 
uncertainty is part and parcel of willing itself: the will “can conceive new projects and enact 
new undertakings that are not predetermined by anything other than itself,” and it can “break 
with the constraints of time by perceiving/imagining what might never come into being.”135 
Arendt’s description of the natality of the will incorporates much of the language of freedom 
and action because the will is the spring of action, and freedom manifests itself in the political 
realm by way of action. Kalyvas writes that Arendt “insert[s] an element of volition” into her 
earlier concept of freedom; that is, in Arendt’s new concept, “[o]ne must will to publicly reveal 
one’s self in order to decide to participate in joint political activities. … It is part of one’s 
freedom to affirm or negate entering into the public realm as an equal and to partake in a 
common project.”136 Through the will’s preparatory activity, individuals “become lucid and 
reflective agents, determining who they want to be and how they want to disclose 
themselves.”137 Thus, according to Kalyvas, the individual wills his entrance into the public 
sphere and, in so doing, he is able to distinguish himself as a unique individual. However, the 
description of the will that he cites here is one that Arendt goes on to describe as a metaphysical 
fallacy: “now Arendt is able to declare that ‘it is the will, whose subject matter is projects, not 
objects, which in a sense creates the person that can be blamed or praised and anyhow held 
responsible not merely for its actions but for its whole ‘Being,’ its character.’”138 While it 
appears as though Arendt is endorsing this notion, she goes on to say: “The Marxian and 
existentialist notions, which play such a great role in twentieth-century thought and pretend 
that man is his own producer and maker, rest on these experiences, even though it is clear that 
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nobody has ‘made’ himself or ‘produced’ his existence; this, I think, is the last of the 
metaphysical fallacies.”139 Although metaphysical fallacies are, of course, fallacious, Arendt 
argues that they spring from real experiences, that there is some truth to them; but this truth is 
misinterpreted by the thinking faculty.140 In other words, the truth that the fallacy possesses is 
not logical truth but a deeper, more human truth: meaning. Arendt writes that the “basic fallacy, 
taking precedence over all specific metaphysical fallacies, is to interpret meaning on the model 
of truth.”141 The fallacies are attempts to decipher the meaning of particular human 
experiences, such as the experience of withdrawal from the world in the activity of thinking.142 
Therefore, while Kalyvas’ interpretation of this newer concept of the will does provide the 
faculty with more strength to bring the actor into the political fold, it lacks grounding in 
Arendt’s writing. However, this lack of grounding enables him to reflect on the possibilities 
that a more robust willing faculty would present to the individual in contemporary society, and 
I argue that these possibilities are a welcome augmentation to the concept. 
Kalyvas concludes with several reflections on what might be gained from a ‘less obscure’ 
conception of the will’s role in politics and the world of appearances. These reflections 
represent positive addenda to Arendt’s concept of the will, despite his interpretation’s 
departure from her writing, and these augmentations bring her concept into the contemporary 
era in a more practicable manner than would be otherwise possible. Concluding his essay, 
Kalyvas writes that the “faculty of the will … could have assisted her, as a mediating concept, 
to better articulate the various links between [freedom and liberation].”143 If the will were to 
function as this mediating concept, then liberation would become a necessity for Arendt’s 
politics. Therefore, a will that is subject to social, economic, and political constraints “becomes 
an inherent impediment to political action and public participation. In other words, only a will 
that is relatively liberated from the necessities and deprivations of life can decide to act.”144 
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And this sort of liberation is, according to Arendt, a pre-requisite for participation in the 
political sphere, but her interpretation of this liberation relies on voluntarism. Kalyvas writes 
that “a revision of the relationship between political freedom and the will” might solve the 
“rather unpleasant exclusionary republican elitism that restricted political participation to those 
who, as [Arendt] said, ‘have a taste for public freedom.’ All others are excluded on the ground 
of their own choice.”145 Arendt’s voluntarist interpretation of the possibilities of participation 
in political action undermines the potential strength of her own theory of politics, especially 
within the contemporary era. Kalyvas asks the crucial question: “How are the ‘self-excluded’ 
genuinely able to choose when they have not liberated themselves from oppression and 
relations of domination, when, in other words, they remain subjugated?”146 (This concluding 
question asked by Kalyvas, of course, echoes the guiding question of our work here, which 
Marcuse asks in One-Dimensional Man, and which I have referenced throughout this thesis.) 
The language of ‘self-exclusion’ when referring to those who remain subjugated in the 
contemporary era drips with condescension and ignorance, and Arendt’s theory of natality and 
action seem to provide the groundwork for a much more liberatory theory of inclusion in 
political action than she herself lets on. 
In the context of our reactionary politics and resurgent/insurgent right-wing extremism, which 
I have referred to as the ‘contemporary era,’ we require a more elaborate understanding of the 
possibilities of political action. If we are to confront the crises that appear to be slowly 
overwhelming humanity—but it is only a matter of time before this slowness becomes terrific 
speed—then we must be able to understand how we can work together, as a global species, to 
deal with them. Arendt’s theory of political action includes the aforementioned element of self-
exclusion—which, I would argue, is the mode of exclusion practiced by certain cynical actors 
on the right—but it does not include a robust understanding of subjugation and oppression; 
that is, self-exclusion as a concept excludes the possibility that there are many people who 
would participate but cannot, who experience “an I-will-and-cannot.”147 These are the people 
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who have been subject to oppression and domination for their entire lives, including prior 
generations of their families and communities. I believe that our aforementioned guiding 
question remains unanswered, but that the provision of an effective answer requires a robust 
theory of political action.  
The willing faculty, in its natality, is a tool for the spontaneous generation of political 
possibilities, as the spring of action. Arendt’s understanding of political freedom, which is a 
departure from and denial of the common idea of sovereignty, is a powerful conceptual tool 
for the introduction of novel and spontaneous events and newly liberated people into the public 
sphere. With the positive augmentations that Kalyvas provides in his essay, her theory could 
be the foundation of an answer to Marcuse’s question—and the faculty of the will indicates the 
way into that foundation. Additionally, Holman provides several insights into the potential 
combination and juxtaposition of the political thought(s) of Arendt and Marcuse, which I will 
now discuss. 
2.3 Seek (a System of Revolutionary) Councils 
In his book, Politics as Radical Creation: Herbert Marcuse and Hannah Arendt on Political 
Performativity, Christopher Holman develops a model of democratic politics that, he argues, 
can universalize the Marcusean understanding of essence, that is, the “capacity for 
creativity.”148 In order to do so, he juxtaposes the philosophical and political thought of both 
Arendt and Marcuse in such a way that the useful elements of both thinkers’ theories are 
brought to the fore, while their relatively lackluster or inadequate elements are critiqued and, 
subsequently, tossed aside. (Such latter elements are, for example, Arendt’s understanding of 
Marxism, which is quite shallow and rests on a clear lack of rigorous research and analysis.) 
Holman argues that the political model that he develops is one of a performative politics that 
encourages and manifests the human capacity for creative expression. The important elements 
of his model for our context are the notion of healthy agonistic political interactions, his 
response to the problem of foundation, and the role of revolutionary councils. Together, these  
elements form a cohesive vision of a performative, democratic politics, which could, I argue, 
 





be a useful motivating principle for politics today; however, I do not think that realizing this 
model is possible in our present context. I believe that more work must be done, and I make 
this case in the next chapter. For now, we must focus on the juxtaposition of Arendt and 
Marcuse that Holman develops in his book; it is a helpful guide for our endeavours into the 
possibilities of social change in the next chapter. 
Holman develops the idea of an agonistic political sphere—explicitly not an antagonistic one—
from Arendt’s discussion of sovereignty and the will. She argues that the idea of sovereignty, 
and the freedom that the tradition has associated with the will, have wreaked havoc and 
violence on societies throughout history. Thus, of course, a healthy and robust political sphere 
must not provide oxygen to these commonly held beliefs about what government should or 
should not do, and what freedoms we do or do not have (freedom from interference vs. freedom 
to act). Instead, for Arendt, political interaction should not “give an expression to the sovereign 
will, but … maximize the conflictual interaction between nonidentical significations for the 
sake of the determination of action oriented toward changing the world[:] … a type of agonism 
rooted in the expression of the uniqueness of beings.”149 These ‘nonidentical significations’ 
refer to the manifestation of this expression of our uniqueness, i.e., the ‘who’ that I express 
when I speak or act in public. Crucially, these agonistic interactions in the public sphere 
approach the possibility of making events, which are “‘occurrences that interrupt routine 
processes and routine procedures,’ the historical accumulation and objectification of which 
constitute history.”150 However, Arendt notes that these interruptions of history and routine are 
not common because politics is uncommon: she  
concede[s] the historical rarity of great and glorious action, writing that ‘politics as 
such has existed so rarely and in so few places that, historically speaking, only a few 
great epochs have known it and turned it into a reality.’ … The recognition of the 
exceptionality of agonal action produces for Arendt a political imperative to reorganize 
human reality such that all citizens are able to express themselves performatively.151 
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Thus, at issue here is the possibility of normalizing the rare occurrence of the introjection of 
the great and glorious into the everyday. Arendt desires “a qualitative reorganization of the 
nature of everyday politics,” and Holman quotes from Hannah Pitkin, who argues that Arendt 
desires “‘a general theory of ongoing free citizenship … [which] suit[s] people’s everyday 
concerns, their ordinary low-profile interests and conflicts, without succumbing to triviality, 
apathy, or privatization. What was needed was a vision of ‘normal,’ ongoing, ordinary politics 
that was not really normal or ordinary.’”152 Furthermore, it bears repeating that Arendt seeks 
the introjection of greatness and glory, which rarely occur in history, into the everyday, thereby 
infusing ‘normal’ politics with the unordinary. In order to achieve this goal, Arendt’s concept 
of greatness cannot be a quality reserved solely for the privileged or the bourgeoisie. Rather, it 
is a sort of capacity for action in the face of subjugation, stasis, or even lethargy. For example, 
in Eichmann in Jerusalem, she refers to those who rose up and fought against the Nazis in the 
Warsaw ghetto as heroes who demonstrated their glory.153 Holman argues that the possibility 
of this sort of qualitative reorganization of politics lies in Arendt’s laudatory discussion of 
revolutionary councils and his own discussion of performative politics. 
Before we explore the revolutionary council tradition, though, we should further examine 
Arendt’s understanding of the way in which great acts interrupt the movement of human time 
and history, because the revolutionary councils themselves attempt to make actionable these 
sorts of interruptions. These interruptions are the great and glorious, and they are part and 
parcel of Arendt’s concept of freedom, which is not the liberum arbitrium, the liberty to choose 
between two alternatives, nor is it the sort of liberty commonly associated with the post-
Enlightenment liberal notion of freedom and liberation. As we discussed above, whereas 
Arendt understands freedom to be “substantively concerned with ‘participation in public 
affairs, or admission to the public realm,’” over time, the “concept of freedom has been 
increasingly separated from considerations of political action, associated instead with ‘the 
more or less free range of non-political activities which a given body politic will permit and 
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guarantee to those who constitute it.’”154 Revolutionary action, in the context of the great 
revolutions in history, aims to reproduce for humanity the experience of its freedom, and, 
simultaneously, this reproduction expresses “the capacity to make something new,” that is, 
natality: revolution aims at “change perceived as being the start of something new, as radical 
beginning,” rather than mere change.155 Revolutions introject “new flights and arcs” into 
human rectilinear history, which itself “cuts across cyclical organic life, interrupting [its] 
repetitive movement,” and these revolutionary changes, these novel beginnings, “are the 
extraordinary, and it is precisely these events that … [are] deserving of having [their] substance 
preserved forever through remembrance[.] … The events that call out to be remembered are 
those that interrupt history’s expected trajectory. It is these that deserve glory.”156 However, 
human revolutionary history can be—at least in part—described as a history of false starts and 
failure, because of the difficulty of producing a foundation; that is, the difficulty of building 
upon the action that springs from the spirit of the revolution, thereby turning it into a stable 
whole. 
Arendt derives her concept of power from the distinction she makes between it and strength, 
which is limited to the individual. Unlike strength, power only exists between people and can 
only be held and exercised by a collective. Holman writes that power is the result of 
“individuals bind[ing] together into a We for the purpose of action.”157 In our context, 
foundation is the act of preserving “the power created through a collective generative act,” that 
is, the attempt to concretize the revolutionary spirit by turning the capacity for beginning into 
a new beginning, thereby producing a “stable foundation for the principle of action that united 
them.”158 Arendt argues that only in America was this ‘stable foundation’ (produced in 
substantive part by human slavery) established in a revolution—despite the fact that the 
revolutionary spirit in America degraded quite rapidly and with it disappeared this 
foundation—because of that country’s foundation generation’s understanding of the necessity 
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of both public participation, resulting in their belief in the importance of local government and 
town councils,159 and  “augmentation” or amendment to the constitution, which “makes 
possible the reproduction of the ontological condition of human life.”160 However, the 
aforementioned degradation occurred because, whereas during the revolution the ‘beginning’ 
and ‘preservation’ aspects of foundation were unified, after the fact, the opposition between 
these two elements was not resolved. Holman recounts how abundant the revolutionary spirit 
was in America before the revolution, which resulted in a set of assumptions regarding the 
necessity for institutional structures that would preserve it:  
it was assumed that the revolutionary impulse toward political creation would continue 
to express itself unabated regardless of the specific structure of the political medium 
within which it was being expressed, [so] the recognition of the fundamental need to 
create institutions specifically oriented toward active citizen participation was lost; the 
concern became one of the need for foundation as such, the latter producing the 
Constitution and its new institutions, which focused not on freedom but liberty, and not 
on participation but representation.161 
This sort of representative system, with its concomitant institutions that preserve ‘liberty,’ i.e., 
sovereignty, makes participation in the public realm for the average citizen both difficult and 
apparently unnecessary; for why would we have elected representatives if we were going to 
participate in the publicity of political life anyway? However, this sort of dichotomy is contrary 
to Arendt’s vision of society, which both lauds and requires active public participation in 
public, social life.  
Holman argues that a proper understanding of this vision requires that we grapple with 
Arendt’s notion of the human capacity to begin and its manifestation in the revolutionary 
council tradition. The aforementioned dichotomy illustrates the philosophical concept of 
freedom, the negative ‘freedom-from,’ or sovereignty, and the rise of statism in the 19th and 
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20th centuries typifies this dichotomy. Arendt’s understanding of political action, which she 
associates with glory in the public sphere, and her concept of natality, i.e., the human capacity 
for beginning, stand in stark contrast to statism “and its corresponding understanding of politics 
as rule, as expressed primarily in the form of the statesman who gives laws. Rulership is 
characterized by a relationship between two sets of individuals, one of whom knows and one 
of whom does not, the latter simply executing the orders of the former.”162 Statism—at least in 
the context of post-revolutionary states—is a function of the ‘revolutionary party,’ which 
Arendt counterposes to the ‘revolutionary council.’ She contends that, in revolutionary history, 
the party won out over the council, and that the council system itself contradicts “most Marxist 
theorizing on the nature of the political,” which tended to view councils as “temporary organs 
that would dissolve after the revolution was completed.”163 Holman considers the notion of a 
‘completed revolution’ antithetical to his idea of performative politics; instead, with Arendt, 
he sees in the council system a powerful mechanism for the manifestation of the sort of radical, 
novel action that she envisions. He discusses the nature of the council system in terms of 
“spontaneous practice,” rather than the “practical application of certain fixed theoretical 
principles generated prior to political action” of the revolutionary party system.164 He writes 
that Arendt’s understanding of the council system is of its potential to function as “a specific 
mode of institutionalization,” which can positively manifest the “interpenetrative flux of the 
wills of nonidentical ‘whos,’” and it lends itself to “the democratic mediation of opinions 
between members of a political We, made for the sake of the radical generation of new political 
modes and orders.”165 Holman endorses Arendt’s concept of political action, and her 
understanding of the powerful role that the revolutionary councils can play in her envisioned 
political order, because he sees major flaws in both Marx’s and Marcuse’s political theories, 
which lie in their “instrumentalist and managerialist models of political transformation.”166 He 
contends that, in fact, Arendt’s theory of political action suits the Marxian dialectic and affirms 
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Marcuse’s understanding of human essence. While Arendt’s understanding of labour and 
dialectics is quite flawed, if we were to juxtapose her understanding of action with Marx’s and 
Marcuse’s concepts of labour, as that activity which affirms the human essence as the capacity 
for creative expression and action, then we could develop a strong theory of political action 
that allows for the sustained production of new beginnings and requires the expression of new 
possibilities. 
Holman thus locates in Arendt’s discussions of the revolutionary councils a potential form the 
new politics can take; on the other hand, Marcuse, in Counterrevolution and Revolt, only 
briefly discusses the council tradition, but in this brief passage he speaks of them quite 
approvingly. In fact, he sees the council tradition as affirming the potential power of workers 
to govern themselves: if we were to see workers begin to control  
individual factories or groups of factories … [we] would recapture a seminal 
achievement of the revolutionary tradition, namely, the ‘councils’ … as organizations 
of self-determination, self-government (or rather preparation for self-government) in 
local popular assemblies. … The historical heir of the authoritarian mass party (or 
rather, its self-perpetuating leadership) is not anarchy but a self-imposed discipline and 
authority—an authority which can only emerge in the struggle itself, recognized by 
those who wage the struggle. However, the … immediate expression of the opinion and 
will of the workers, farmers, neighbors … is not, per se, progressive and a force of 
social change. The councils will be the organs of revolution only to the degree to which 
they represent the people in revolt.167 
Thus, even though Marcuse is here discussing specifically workers’ councils, rather than 
purely political councils, he clearly draws a connection between these bodies and politics—
insofar as he recognizes them as the ‘heirs’ of the mass parties. Holman writes that, if the 
councils institutionalize a new organization of labour “according to the logic of [the creative] 
impulse, then they also provide an institutional ground for the reorganization of politics 
 





according to this same logic.”168 He goes on to argue that the councils are the sole political 
form that is “concerned with the actualization of the human capacity for self-overcoming.”169 
The future political community that manifests this capacity must, in its very constitution, affirm 
impermanence and continually acknowledge the discrepancy between potential and actual. 
Therefore, the community must have a negative rather than a positive harmony, whereby it 
will be “capable of recognizing the impermanence not only of the individual’s existence but of 
its own as well,” and this recognition relies on a system of councils “that is always open to the 
movement of history, always willing to put into question and scrutinize the present existence 
through the dialectical analysis of this existence’s potentialities.”170 Holman argues that this 
future form of the political community is a performative end in itself because it is 
“substantively oriented toward the generalization of the performative impulse, to a form of 
institutionalization which is able to accommodate creative contestation over matters of public 
concern within a nonantagonistic and non-surplus repressive context.”171 In other words, the 
ideal future political community is not antagonistic but agonistic, and, insofar as it is a 
performative end in itself, it encourages both joy in public life and human flourishing through 
the generalization of the creative impulse, which is human essence. 
2.4 Conclusion: O Ideal, Where Art Thou? 
At the end of this exploration, we have before us a clear vision of an ideal political community 
that encourages the consistent and thoroughgoing manifestation of the human essence, which 
is creative and spontaneous, and this community takes the form of a system of revolutionary 
councils—or a more modern cognate of the very same. Arendt’s understanding of the will and 
natality aid us in formulating a more cohesive model that this community can take, insofar as 
these are inherent human capacities: the former a capacity for projecting the self into the future 
indeterminately, the latter an ability to introduce radically new things, events, and so on into 
the world. The system of revolutionary councils is the institutionalization of these capacities, 
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that is, their objectification in the public realm, and, ideally, these councils would ensure the 
perpetuation of this objectification.  
However, one major issue arises when we attempt to imagine the course that human civilization 
must take in order to reach this ideal world: how do we get there? There is no clear answer to 
this question in Holman, Arendt, or Marcuse—nor in their combination. Each of these authors 
offer us visions of possible better worlds, but none of them seem to offer a strong theory of 
social change. Marcuse had planned on developing such a theory,172 but this project never came 
to fruition. Arendt and Holman’s theory of change, developed from her understanding of the 
revolutionary councils and the revolutionary impulse, is, to my mind, insufficient insofar as 
neither author shows how we can implement such a society-wide system of councils; her 
discussion of them makes plain that there is not an example from history of such a system 
working on a large scale in (relative) perpetuity. Holman’s ideal, i.e., a performative politics 
that incorporates both Marcuse’s and Arendt’s theories of society, action, and the individual, 
is something that I believe we should strive for, but the striving is the problem: how do we get 
there? And, again, the question that Marcuse raises in One-Dimensional Man remains 
unanswered: how do people who have been the objects of domination and subjugation liberate 
themselves from their condition? 
In the next chapter, I develop my answer to this question. I argue that it is helpful for us to 
overlay Kuhn’s notion of paradigm shifts on top of Marcuse’s concept of quantitative change 
leading to qualitative change, because the paradigm shift itself is that border that we have, as 
yet been unable to cross: the border between potential and actual, between the present and the 
new beginning.  In addition, I discuss Rorty’s distinction between movements and campaigns, 
as well as Ricoeur’s concept of metaphor and metaphoricity. The latter discussion is an analysis 
of the ways in which metaphor can inspire action through the telling of inspirational stories.
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3 Three Wise Men?: Kuhn, Ricoeur, Rorty 
Our discussion of the mechanisms of social containment left us with a question that has 
recurred throughout this thesis: how do people who have been the objects of domination and 
subjugation liberate themselves from this condition? And now, after discussing performative 
politics, we are confronted with a second question: how do we get to the ideal of performative 
politics with a system of (revolutionary) councils? The answers to both of these questions are 
not identical, but they are closely related. I argue that we can find them in a threefold 
juxtaposition of Marcuse’s quantitative/qualitative change concept, Thomas Kuhn’s theory of 
scientific revolutions, and Richard Rorty’s discussion of the distinctions between movements 
and campaigns. As we have seen, Marcuse’s dilemma regarding people’s self-liberation is a 
central issue for this thesis; moreover, it is a major concern for any theory of social change that 
has as its premise an understanding of some form of social containment. Kuhn’s theory of 
scientific revolutions, though, includes an understanding of the internal generation of 
revolutionary environments: through the practice of ‘normal science,’ anomalies and crises 
arise, which create an opening for the production and adoption of new paradigms that 
provide—or demonstrate the potential to provide—solutions to these issues.  
Our problem, then, requires us to delineate his theory, and to subsequently search for a potential 
socio-political analogue for the practice of normal science. I argue that this analogue can be 
found in a combination of the quantitative/qualitative change schema and Rorty’s concept of 
‘campaigns.’ Moreover, Ricoeur’s analysis of metaphor provides us with an understanding of 
the heuristic power of fiction and metaphor that can help guide action in the public sphere. 
First, we will briefly review Marcuse’s quantitative/qualitative change concept, after which we 
will dive into Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions and normal science. Then, we will address 
Rorty’s distinction between movements and campaigns, and his understanding of the 
inspirational power of stories. Finally, we will bring the concepts we have developed thus far 
into a discussion of Ricoeur’s notions of the activity of metaphor, which will allow us to 





3.1 Crisis as a Way of Life (but It’s a Good Thing) 
In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse recognizes the difficulties that confront us when we try to 
enact change in society. These difficulties arise at least in part due to the recalcitrance of the 
public at large; in other words, there is a qualitative difference between what changes Marcuse 
argues we need and what the public is willing and able to change. He believes that we need to 
discover extant possibilities that can qualitatively change people’s lives, but he is, in general, 
hesitant to endorse top-down change. He thinks it is important for people to bring about their 
own liberation, which points to the central question that we have discussed several times, 
regarding people creating the conditions of their own freedom.1 The impetus for qualitative 
change lacking from the outset, Marcuse develops a theory of social change that incorporates 
something reminiscent of a ‘critical-mass’ concept of change: “quantitative development 
becomes qualitative change if it attains the very structure of an established system.”2 At this 
point, though, we find ourselves in a difficult situation, which stipulates that those who would 
enact this development-leading-to-change must already possess a recognition of the need for 
this liberation, because it “presupposes transcendence within these conditions.”3 Therefore, we 
must discover some sort of internal psychological mechanism by which people can achieve 
this recognition, this transcendence. I discuss the possibilities that this development could 
produce below, in conjunction with Ricoeur’s concept of metaphor. For now, let us develop 
the quantitative-qualitative change formula further. 
Marcuse ties quantitative change to aesthetics in An Essay on Liberation, where he discusses 
the subversive possibilities that minor, relatively aesthetic, changes to the system present. He 
says that a “quantity” of reforms, such as “better zoning regulations” and “a modicum of 
protection from noise and dirt … would turn into the quality of radical change to the degree to 
which they would critically weaken the economic, political, and cultural pressure and power 
groups.”4 These changes would serve the individual’s true needs rather than the externally 
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imposed false needs of advanced industrial society and, simultaneously, they would function 
as the sort of quantitative development that we described above. So long as this development 
occurs with the proper goal in mind, that is, the goal of liberation and the recognition of the 
impossibility of continuing “to exist in this universe, so that the need for qualitative change is 
a matter of life and death,”5 then quantitative development presents us with a real possibility 
for qualitative change. Now, let us discuss Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions, which 
displays what revolutionary possibilities the practice of ‘normal science’ presents.  
Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions involves two fundamental mechanisms: normal science 
and paradigms, and both are crucial for our purposes here. Normal science is the quotidian 
practice of scientific work, such as research. It is “firmly based upon one or more past scientific 
achievements,” which provide(s) the “foundation for its further practice.”6 These achievements 
are paradigms, and scientific communities function through their internally accepted shared 
paradigm(s), according to which they “are committed to the same rules and standards for 
scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites 
for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition.”7 A 
successful paradigm is not a measure of its total success solving any given problem; rather, a 
paradigm is successful if it possesses “a promise of success discoverable in selected and still 
incomplete examples.”8 Whereas the paradigm has this promise of potential success, normal 
science is “the actualization of that promise … achieved by extending the knowledge of those 
facts that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the extent of the match 
between those facts and the paradigm’s predictions, and by further articulation of the paradigm 
itself.”9 In a sense, the paradigm is the framework within which scientists practice normal 
science, which in turn makes real the promise of success that lies at the core of the paradigm. 
We will discuss paradigms themselves in greater detail below because our discussion of them 
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must be part and parcel of our discussion of scientific revolutions; for now, let us focus our 
attention on normal science. 
Kuhn describes normal science in terms of puzzle- and problem-solving because the practice 
of it is predicated on the existence of a solution, and the regular practice of normal science 
involves the research that aims to uncover said solution. However, this activity is also 
characterized by the repeated discovery of anomalies, and these discoveries have tended to 
lead to crisis moments for scientific communities. Although normal science does not aim at 
novelty, it is typical of scientific practice that novelty is produced in the form of new theories 
and new phenomena: “Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the 
recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern 
normal science. It then continues with a more or less extended exploration of the area of 
anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous 
has become the expected.”10 Sometimes, though, the awareness of anomaly does not lead to 
this sort of integration or introjection; instead, the sheer amount of anomalies grows until a 
crisis situation ensues. In three examples, which Kuhn notes are typical of the crisis situation, 
he says that “a novel theory emerged only after a pronounced failure in the normal problem-
solving activity. … The novel theory seems a direct response to crisis. … The significance of 
crises is the indication they provide that an occasion for retooling [of the paradigm] has 
arrived.”11 Another crucial point that Kuhn raises about these crisis examples is that their 
solutions “had been at least partially anticipated during a period when there was no crisis in 
the corresponding science.”12 If we briefly foray into non-scientific analogues, Kuhn’s thinking 
is potentially quite useful for us.  
For if we were to recognize the crisis situations that we are currently in, such as crises of 
capital, of democracy, of ecology, etc., then it is possible that people might be willing to give 
something else a shot. However, it is obvious that, in Kuhn’s thinking, it is scientists who make 
the leap of faith to a new system, and it is not obvious what potential analogue for scientists 
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exists in the public sphere. (If we accept that Marcuse’s ‘revolutionary group’ is this analogue, 
then we can develop the thought further, but we must also grapple with the fact that Marcuse, 
by the end of his career, decidedly drops the notion of ‘revolutionary groups’ altogether, 
instead advocating for the ‘long march through the institutions.’ We will discuss this further 
below.)  
The crisis situation is the context within which paradigm shifts and scientific revolutions occur. 
When it becomes clear that an anomaly is more than “just another puzzle of normal science, 
the transition to crisis and to extraordinary science has begun.”13 When we reach a crisis 
moment, several things can happen: a solution can arise from within the existing paradigm, 
scientists may realize that no solution can come from their scientific field, or else “a crisis may 
end with the emergence of a new candidate for paradigm and with the ensuing battle over its 
acceptance.”14 The crisis does not merely reveal the holes in the established paradigm. It also 
“loosens the stereotypes and provides the incremental data necessary for a fundamental 
paradigm shift.”15 Movement from a collapsing paradigm into a new one is “far from a 
cumulative process[.] … During the transition period there will be a considerable but never 
complete overlap between the problems that can be solved by the old and by the new 
paradigm.”16 And, to continue the potential Marcusean analogy, Kuhn writes that the scientists 
that have invented new paradigms have tended to be “little committed by prior practice to the 
traditional rules of normal science, [and] are particularly likely to see that those rules no longer 
define a playable game and to conceive another set that can replace them.”17 This description 
of the inventive scientists who create new paradigms aligns quite closely with Marcuse’s 
description, at the end of One-Dimensional Man, of the potentially revolutionary groups that 
he sees in the civil rights movement, the student movements, and so on: “They exist outside 
the democratic process; … their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not. 
… [It] is an elementary force which violates the rules of the game and, in doing so, reveals it 
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as a rigged game.”18 So, again, we see some parallels that we will tease out in greater detail 
below; for now, it is sufficient to note that these avenues of exploration exist. 
Kuhn also compares the scientific revolutions that he describes to political revolutions. Both 
types of revolutions come about through a “growing sense,” which is usually “restricted to a 
segment” of the relevant community (i.e., political or scientific), “that existing institutions” or 
“an existing paradigm” have “ceased adequately to meet the problems” that arise in the relevant 
field or environment.19 Moreover, Kuhn writes that both revolutions are predicated upon a 
“sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis.”20 He argues that the goals of political revolutions 
are prohibited by the institutions that they seek to change, and so, typically, a new set of 
institutions is proposed or produced that fulfill the needs or wishes of the revolutionaries. In 
the intervening period of time, though, there is usually a period in which “society is not fully 
governed by institutions at all.”21 Once a new set of institutions is proposed or produced, a 
polarization takes hold between competing camps (each favouring one set of institutions over 
the other). At this point, “political recourse fails,” because revolutions are “partially 
extrapolitical or extrainstitutional events.”22 The sets of institutions, and the camps that support 
one set over the other, are incompatible: the communities become incommensurable. Kuhn 
writes that, similarly, the choice is between “incompatible modes of community life. … When 
paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily 
circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm’s defense. … It cannot 
be made logically or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into the 
circle.”23 Therefore, the attempt to convert others to one’s own paradigm must be one of 
persuasion by virtue of the possibilities that the paradigm presents—it cannot be a conversion 
by way of proofs. 
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The possibilities that a new paradigm presents to the relevant community(s) are the main 
instrument(s) of conversion. Kuhn details the difficulties that confront those who attempt to 
convert the ‘old guard’ of the scientific community: “The source of resistance is the assurance 
that the older paradigm will ultimately solve all its problems, that nature can be shoved into 
the box the paradigm provides.”24 However, in the examples of successful paradigm shifts that 
he provides, it is clear that the “single most prevalent claim advanced by the proponents of a 
new paradigm is that they can solve the problems that have led the old one to a crisis.”25 
Crucially, though, this is not always immediately the case; that is, typically, the new paradigm 
only presents a promise of being able to solve these problems, rather than being able to do so 
right away. Kuhn writes that the main “issue is which paradigm should in the future guide 
research on problems many of which neither competitor can yet claim to resolve completely.”26 
Thus, the person who decides to follow the new paradigm must “have faith that the new 
paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that confront it, knowing only that the 
older paradigm has failed with a few. A decision of that kind can only be made on faith.”27 
(Arendt, too, locates within the promise a guiding or binding principle for human action.)28 
Therefore, Kuhn argues that we cannot simply rely on crises to force novelty and conversions 
to new paradigms: “There must also be a basis, though it need be neither rational nor ultimately 
correct, for faith in the particular candidate chosen. … [I]f a paradigm is ever to triumph it 
must gain some first supporters[.] … Rather than a single group conversion, what occurs is an 
increasing shift in the distribution of professional allegiances.”29 Here, again, we may discover 
a potential analogue to our ‘critical mass’ theory of social change, which involves Marcuse’s 
quantitative/qualitative change concept, but we will discuss this further below. 
From Kuhn, we can gather a relatively barebones structure for the sort of ‘revolution’ that 
would incorporate the mode of social change we are looking for. We will add to this structure 
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as we progress, but, for now, let us elucidate what we have thus far. The practice of normal 
science occurs within an already-existing paradigm, which dictates the relevant forms and 
objects of research. Normal science is a sort of problem- or puzzle-solving activity, and the 
problems and puzzles that it aims to solve are the problems that the paradigm itself points to 
as potentially solvable. However, in the course of this normal-scientific research, anomalies 
naturally arise that seem to be intractable or unsolvable within the parameters of the current 
paradigm. Sometimes scientists discover solutions to these anomalies within the paradigm; at 
other times, the anomalies remain unsolvable. At a certain point, if the quantity of anomalies 
grows, and the lack of solutions for them becomes overwhelming, the relevant scientific 
community enters into a ‘crisis situation,’ wherein a novel theory may be introduced. Some 
scientists may take a leap of faith and accept this new theory as a new, competing paradigm. 
If this occurs, then the competing paradigms may do metaphorical battle, and it is possible that 
this new paradigm takes hold within the community at large. The main reason that some may 
choose to subscribe to this new paradigm is not necessarily that it solves the specific problems 
that led to the crisis situation; rather, it is the promise of success in these areas that may 
convince some—or many—to jump ship and amass under the banner of the new paradigm.  
The question for us in what follows is whether it is possible to develop a theory of social change 
in the public and political sphere(s) that can function in an analogous manner. I do not think 
that this is the appropriate venue to attempt to form the requisite analogical taxonomy, nor do 
I think that such an exercise would be particularly fruitful. However, I believe that Kuhn’s 
model is helpful as a guide for further discussion, insofar as his vocabulary and conceptual 
framework provide useful signposts that may help ground our discussion. I believe that this is 
a fruitful exercise that sheds light on some of the ways out of the problems that confront all of 
us in the contemporary era—we can view what follows as analogous to the practice of ‘normal 
science,’ insofar as we attempt to solve pervasive problems and puzzles that confront us in 
contemporary society.  
3.2 Unmoving Movements 
In order to effect qualitative change in the structure of our society, Marcuse argues that we 
must first produce quantitative changes. Moreover, these quantitative changes must be 





must abstract from the actual organization and utilization of society’s resources, and from the 
results of this organization and utilization. … The ‘possibilities’ must be within the reach of 
the respective society; they must be definable goals of practice.”30 In Eros and Civilization, he 
provides an example of such a quantitative change that could lead to qualitative change: “the 
quantitative reduction in labor time and energy leads to a qualitative change in the human 
existence: the free rather than the labor time determines its content.”31 And, in One-
Dimensional Man, as we have already discussed, he describes the quantitative change in the 
“occupational stratification” of the productive professions: “the number of non-production 
workers increases. This quantitative change refers back to a change in the character of the basic 
instruments of production … reducing the ‘professional autonomy’ of the laborer and 
integrating him with other professions which suffer and direct the technical ensemble.”32 Thus, 
the quantitative change—i.e., the introduction of non-production workers into the formerly 
productive workforce—leads to a qualitative change—i.e., the productive worker’s 
‘professional autonomy’ slips away from him. Later in One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse 
delineates his understanding of the quantitative/qualitative change formula in more detail: 
Historical truth is comparative; the rationality of the possible depends on that of the 
actual, the truth of the transcending project on that of the project in realization. … 
Continuity is preserved through rupture: quantitative development becomes qualitative 
change if it attains the very structure of an established system; the established 
rationality becomes irrational when, in the course of its internal development, the 
potentialities of the system have outgrown its institutions.33 
And, crucially, this transcendence must occur within the already-existing system. Because such 
transcendence relies on the existing material conditions that can satisfy the possibilities that 
the system projects into the future, the transcending project must occur within the system itself: 
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Transcendence beyond the established conditions (of thought and action) presupposes 
transcendence within these conditions. This negative freedom—i.e., freedom from the 
oppressive and ideological power of given facts—is the a priori of the historical 
dialectic; it is the element of choice and decision in and against historical determination. 
None of the given alternatives is by itself determinate negation unless and until it is 
consciously seized in order to break the power of intolerable conditions and attain the 
more rational, more logical conditions rendered possible by the prevailing ones. … The 
negation proceeds on empirical grounds; it is a historical project within and beyond an 
already going project, and its truth is a chance to be determined on these grounds.34 
Thus, according to these pronouncements on the possibilities for change that exist within the 
system that Marcuse decries as oppressive and repressive, we cannot simply destroy everything 
and build a better society. We must transform the current society with the proper, free end in 
mind, in order to make possible the complete break in the vicious circle that he envisions and 
deems absolutely necessary for the people’s liberation.  
Richard Rorty’s text, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America, 
presents a strong vision of what kind of politics and what kind of action is required to carry 
out this sort of quantitative development. This is rather unexpected, since Rorty’s text is quite 
antagonistic to the New Left—which he derisively calls the ‘cultural Left’—and the leftist 
movements that have cropped up in the wake of the Sixties. His main, substantive critique of 
the contemporary Left is that it no longer aims to be an agent but a spectator, and it is thus no 
longer focused on economic or labour issues but cultural issues: “Leftists in the academy have 
permitted cultural politics to supplant real politics, and have collaborated with the Right in 
making cultural issues central to public debate. … The academic Left has no projects to 
propose to America, no vision of a country to be achieved by building a consensus on the need 
for specific reforms.”35 While the concepts of ‘consensus’ and ‘reform’ may seem anathema 
to the Marcusean project, my goal in this section is to describe the ways in which Rorty’s 
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understanding of reform is not as moderate as it may appear, and that this understanding of 
reform is, in fact, exactly the sort of quantitative development that Marcuse claims is the 
prerequisite of qualitative change.  
Rorty’s focus on literature and the creative arts as vehicles of inspiration for a future that is 
better and more just than the present one aligns quite closely with Marcuse’s understanding of 
the same. Thus, to begin we will outline Rorty’s critiques of the contemporary Left (though 
they may not be as true today as they were in the late Nineties), as well as the laudatory 
endorsement he provides for the leftist politics of the early twentieth century. He focuses this 
discussion on Dewey’s philosophy and Whitman’s poetry because he sees them as the 
forefathers of the American civic religion of that era. Following this outline, we will discuss 
the distinction he makes between movements and campaigns, which will lead us into his view 
of the arts and literature as having strong, powerful inspirational value. 
Whitman and Dewey represent a form of patriotism that Rorty does not see as toxic or overly 
nationalistic; instead, their patriotism is a sort of pride in what America could be, in the promise 
of America. And he also sees in this pride a move toward a more secularist vision of the people 
and the nation.36 The secular vision allows Dewey and Whitman to view America “as an 
opportunity to see ultimate significance in a finite, human, historical project, rather than in 
something eternal and nonhuman. … It is a matter of forgetting about eternity. More generally, 
it is a matter of replacing shared knowledge of what is already real with social hope for what 
might become real.”37 This vision rejects Being as the stabilizing force of the nation’s 
possibilities and, instead, incorporates Becoming into its essence, just as Marcuse’s 
understanding of the concept of essence emphasizes change and Becoming. This understanding 
of what is possible requires the temporalization of action, and the “price of temporalization is 
contingency,” which means that both Dewey and Whitman “had to grant the possibility that 
the vanguard of humanity may lose its way, and perhaps lead our species over a cliff.”38 
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Similarly, Arendt discusses the importance of contingency, which she draws from Duns 
Scotus.  
She discovers in Scotus a conception of the will which not only accepts the role of contingency 
in life but, on the contrary, views contingency as a vital part of willing and living: “Scotus did 
not denigrate the idea of contingency but rather regarded it as a spontaneous beginning of 
something which cannot be predicted.”39 We can also turn to Althusser’s theorization of 
contingency and the aleatory character of the encounter: “every encounter might not have taken 
place, although it did take place; but its possible nonexistence sheds light on the meaning of 
its aleatory being. … [N]othing in the elements of the encounter prefigures, before the actual 
encounter, the contours and determinations of the being that will emerge from it.”40 Through 
his discussion of the “contingency of necessity” and the “necessity of the contingency at its 
root,”41 Althusser aims to show that things could be—and could have been—otherwise than 
they are and have become; that is, the ostensibly stable ‘laws’ of history “can change at the 
drop of a hat, revealing the aleatory basis that sustains them[.] … This is what strikes everyone 
so forcefully during the great commencements, turns or suspensions of history, … when the 
dice are, as it were, thrown back on to the table unexpectedly, or the cards are dealt out again 
without warning.”42 It is crucial that we understand ‘the way things are’ not as inevitable and 
unchangeable, for this would reinforce a positivistic, teleological, and, above all, false concept 
of history. Things could have been, could be—could still be—otherwise than they are.  
Althusser criticizes Marx for abandoning his early conception of the mode of production, 
which is one that recognizes and builds upon the aleatory encounter of disparate elements (e.g., 
workers, owners, etc.), in favour of a concept of production that essentializes the proletariat, 
capitalism, and production. This first concept recognizes that the aforementioned elements “do 
not exist in history so that a mode of production may exist, they exist in history in a ‘floating’ 
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state prior to their ‘accumulation’ and ‘combination’, each being the product of its own history, 
and none being the teleological product of the others or their history.”43 If we accept this 
concept, then we accept that things did not have to occur in the way that they did, and, 
therefore, the way things are, in our time, was not inevitable: we can effect change. However, 
Marx’s later concept “leaves the aleatory nature of the ‘encounter’ and its ‘taking-hold’ to one 
side in order to think solely in terms of the accomplished fact of the ‘take’ and, consequently, 
its predestination.”44 Thus, when Marx and Engels describe the proletariat “as a ‘product of 
big industry’, … [they confuse] the production of the proletariat with its capitalist 
reproduction on an extended scale, as if the capitalist mode of production pre-existed one of 
its essential elements, an expropriated labour-force. … Everything is accomplished in advance; 
the structure precedes its elements and reproduces them in order to reproduce the structure.”45 
If we accept this concept as a factual description of things, then we must accept the inevitability 
of the combination of the elements, and we must grant the essential and necessary connection 
between capitalism and the movement of history. Ellen Meiksins Wood discusses this concept, 
too, and she describes “accounts of the origin of capitalism” as being “fundamentally circular; 
they have assumed the prior existence of capitalism in order to explain its coming into being.”46 
Against this traditional understanding of the origins of capitalism, which contends that 
capitalism is “a natural and inevitable consequence of human nature,” Meiksins Wood posits 
that this system is, instead, “a late and localized product of very specific historical 
conditions.”47 Above all, like Althusser, Meiksins Wood emphasizes the specificity and 
contingency of the capitalist system. 
Contingency figures into Dewey’s philosophy insofar as “evaluative terms such as ‘true’ and 
‘right’” are no longer moored to “some antecedently existing thing—such as God’s Will, or 
Moral Law, or the Intrinsic Nature of Objective Reality.”48 This unmooring means that 
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progress is no longer teleological in the sense of being aimed at some specific, particular goal; 
now, we can “see it as a matter of solving more problems. Progress is, as Thomas Kuhn 
suggested, measured by the extent to which we have made ourselves better than we were in the 
past rather than by our increased proximity to a goal.”49 Thus, Rorty’s pragmatism would have 
us move away from the over-theorization of the political and the social, away from the 
academization of leftist politics, away from discussions of “the infinite and the 
unrepresentable,” because all of these features of the ‘cultural Left’ are obstacles that it places 
in front of itself, which, he argues, achieve nothing in the public sphere (however useful they 
may be for “individual quests for private perfection”).50 Instead, Rorty argues that, in order to 
think “about how to achieve our country,” we need not  
worry about the correspondence theory of truth, the grounds of normativity, the 
impossibility of justice, or the infinite distance which separates us from the other. For 
those purposes, we can give both religion and philosophy a pass. We can just get on 
with trying to solve what Dewey called “the problems of men.” To think about those 
problems means … deriving our moral identity, at least in part, from our citizenship in 
a democratic nation-state, and from leftist attempts to fulfill the promise of that 
nation.51 
Rorty’s critique of the cultural Left arises from this over-academization and over-theorization, 
which he argues results in a cynicism that simultaneously makes it difficult to achieve anything 
and obscures the possibilities for betterment and amelioration that the Left could present to the 
public at large. The Left is “convinced that the nation-state is obsolete,” but the unfortunate 
reality is that “the government of our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only 
agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted 
on Americans. It is no comfort to those in danger of being immiserated by globalization to be 
told that, since national governments are now irrelevant, we must think up a replacement for 
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such governments.”52 Here, Rorty’s critique seems to be at its strongest, for he goes on to argue 
that all of this quibbling and squabbling amounts to nothing other than distractions among 
those who actually could change things for the better, i.e., the Left. Meanwhile, the 
“cosmopolitan super-rich do not think any replacements [for national governments] are 
needed, and they are likely to prevail.”53 That is, the Left spends its time infighting and 
declaiming the irrelevancy of the nation-state, while those with the money and power in society 
laugh—because they want nothing more than a weak and ineffectual Left “whose members are 
so busy unmasking the present that they have no time to discuss what laws need to be passed 
in order to create a better future.”54 In essence, Rorty’s point is that the cultural Left is stuck 
in the academy, whereas the majority of the population “still want to feel patriotic. They still 
want to feel part of a nation which can take control of its destiny and make itself a better 
place.”55 If this is the case, then the Left must take account of this desire and incorporate it into 
a plan for this better future. 
In order for the Left to actually achieve its goals, it must first delineate those goals; then, it 
must develop specific, quantifiable strategies, or ‘campaigns,’ to achieve these goals. (There 
must also be a positive and hopeful vision of the future that guides and structures these goals, 
which we discuss below in conjunction with Ricoeur’s concept of metaphor.) According to 
Rorty, the main reason that the cultural Left remains weak is that it is, at its core, a Manichean 
movement: the cultural Left “will have a hard time transforming itself into a political Left … 
[because] it still dreams of being rescued by an angelic power called ‘the people.’ In this sense, 
‘the people’ is the name of a redemptive preternatural force, a force whose demonic counterpart 
is named ‘power’ or ‘the system.’”56 This sort of thinking “produces dreams not of political 
reforms but of inexplicable, magical transformations.”57 And, because of this ‘magical 
thinking,’ Rorty argues, the cultural Left remains unpolitical and is light on the details of what 
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this better world that it envisions will look like (we can see this sort of magical thinking in 
Marcuse’s refusal to provide anything beyond a brief sketch of the outline of the future, better 
society). However, this is insufficient for “the public which must be won over if the Left is to 
emerge from the academy into the public square[.] … The public, sensibly, has no interest in 
getting rid of capitalism until it is offered details about the alternatives. Nor should it be 
interested in participatory democracy … until it is told how deliberative assemblies will acquire 
the same know-how which only the technocrats presently possess.”58 The point here is not to 
say that it is incorrect for thinkers such as Marcuse to take the stance that it is impossible to 
provide a detailed vision of the future; instead, the point is that this stance is not politically 
useful, and Rorty argues that we have had enough of politically useless theorizing. The decision 
to avoid the description or articulation of a possible better future is a sure-fire way to hamstring 
the Left’s ability to grow its popular base, which Rorty argues the Left must have in order to 
enact the changes that might lead to this better future. That is, it is not politically useful, though 
it may be conceptually sound. It is time to enact specific, quantifiable changes that help people 
now. 
Rorty sees the contemporary Left as being too focused on movements, while he argues that it 
should be focused on campaigns. A campaign is “something finite, something that can be 
recognized to have succeeded or to have, so far, failed. Movements, by contrast, neither 
succeed nor fail. They are too big and too amorphous to do anything that simple.”59 Movements 
are all-or-nothing, and, to a movement, any one given campaign that it carries out is always 
only one part of a much larger whole; therefore, the movement usually incorporates more than 
just political or social campaigns. Movements tend to “levy contributions” from cultural areas, 
such as the arts, history, and philosophy, because they “provide a larger context within which 
politics is no longer just politics, but rather the matrix out of which will emerge something like 
Paul’s ‘new being in Christ’ or Mao’s ‘new socialist man.’”60 Membership in a movement 
offers a sense of purity to the individual: “The easiest way to assure oneself of this purity is to 
will one thing—but this requires seeing everything as part of a pattern whose center is that 
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single thing. Movements offer such a pattern, and thus offer such assurance of purity.”61 
However, if one is swept up into a movement, and this ostensible purity turns out to be an 
illusion or is corrupted, then an entire worldview is corrupted along with it. Meanwhile, the 
advantage of the campaign is that “there is always another campaign to enlist in when the first 
fails or goes rancid. … [T]he impurity of a campaign can be taken in one’s stride: such impurity 
is just what one expects of something finite and mortal.”62 (Arendt has much to say about 
movements, too, especially with regard to the movement of totalitarian movements, though I 
think the fact that both Rorty and Arendt criticize ‘movements’ is more of a coincidental 
misnomer than anything significant.) The examples that Rorty provides of ‘campaigns’ are: 
“the unionization of migrant farm workers, or the overthrow (by votes or by force) of a corrupt 
government, or socialized medicine, or legal recognition of gay marriage.”63 Clearly, one of 
these examples is not like the others, and it is odd that Rorty would include this example in a 
text that is quite adamantly anti-revolutionary.  
Regardless, these examples of campaigns cut across social, economic, and personal 
boundaries, not fitting neatly in any of these categories. And this is reminiscent of Marcuse’s 
examples of quantitative developments that he discusses in An Essay on Liberation: “the 
harmless drive for better zoning regulations[,] … decommercialization of nature, total urban 
reconstruction, … such action would become increasingly subversive of the institutions of 
capitalism and of their morality. The quantity of such reforms would turn into the quality of 
radical change.”64 And Rorty discusses quantitative changes in a very similar manner: 
“Someday, perhaps, cumulative piecemeal reforms will be found to have brought about 
revolutionary change. Such reforms might someday produce a presently unimaginable 
nonmarket economy, and much more widely distributed powers of decisionmaking. … But in 
the meantime, we should not let the abstractly described best be the enemy of the better.”65 
What is so enticing about these theories of social change is that, in order to be potentially 
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successful, quantitative campaigns only require achievability and broad appeal (and each of 
these relies on the other). This is, of course, an oversimplification, lacking nuance, but the 
nuance comes in the details of the specific campaigns, and we can look to Kuhn’s analysis of 
normal science for ideas of what that kind of practice might look like. 
Let us think of campaigns in the same terms that Kuhn thinks of normal science: puzzle- or 
problem-solving within the bounds of the relevant paradigm. The solutions that we search for 
are those in which the paradigm itself promises success. For Kuhn, it is not science as a whole 
that possesses a paradigm; rather, any given scientific community, such as the community of 
quantum physicists, for example, possesses a paradigm and conducts normal science within its 
boundaries. For the sake of argument, then, let us take the populations of the group of Western 
liberal-democratic, capitalist nation-states as constituting a community. (This is, of course, a 
rather large, amorphous group of nations with particular differences, especially regarding 
governmental structures. For the sake of argument, I will be deploying circumstances that 
apply, for the most part, to Canada and the United States, especially because the Eurozone 
countries have a completely different economic regime than do Canada and the US.) To apply 
the normal science analogy to campaigns in the public sphere, we can see fights to raise the 
minimum wage, for affordable housing, the elimination of single-family zoning, and others 
along the same lines, as quantitative campaigns that function in the public sphere just as normal 
science does in the given scientific community. Each of the aforementioned goals is potentially 
available to us within the parameters of our current socio-politico-economic paradigm.  
The paradigm itself, one could argue, has promised to be successful in these areas, but as of 
yet, clearly, the practice of ‘normal living,’ or ‘normal politics,’ has come up against 
anomalies, such as oligarchic mega-corporations and their monopolies, for example. Unlike 
the order of things in the ‘50s and ‘60s, the system no longer delivers the goods. Whether this 
is an anomaly, a crisis, or both, it is clear that this situation begs for a competing paradigm. I 
am not in a position here to argue that there is a competing paradigm that is superior to our 
current one (though there are many who would at this point propose socialism as that 
competitor). I hold a similar pessimism to Marcuse’s near the end of his career; that is, I do 
not believe that a revolution in any traditional sense is the answer. Instead, I argue with Rorty 





answer for now, and Marcuse seems to have adopted a similar view at different points in his 
career, specifically his theory of quantitative development leading to qualitative change. And, 
again, I am in no position here to propose specific campaigns that I believe will solve all of 
our problems—nor do I think that there should be any one voice that functions as this sort of 
top-down ‘voice of change.’ On the contrary, I believe that we, every one of us, need to 
discover inspiration in the world, whether that be in the arts, in other people, or elsewhere, that 
can guide us toward the goals that we believe should be accomplished. We, the Left, need to, 
as Rorty says, develop a vision of the world, which we presently live in, that does not ignore 
its flaws, but that does not devolve into a Manichean worldview. We need to see the promise 
in the world, the potential for betterment, the better things that can be, that should be.  
3.3 Conclusion: Hope, Metaphor, and Inspiration 
Appended to Achieving Our Country is an essay titled, “The Inspirational Value of Great 
Works.” In this essay, Rorty describes the power that lies within great works of literature—
though it could be ascribed to all artistic creations: “these works make people think there is 
more to this life than they ever imagined. … If it is to have inspirational value, a work must be 
allowed to recontextualize much of what you previously thought you knew; it cannot, at least 
at first, be itself recontextualized by what you already believe.”66 This understanding of 
inspiration, as a redescription of the world in a new context, is quite similar to Ricoeur’s 
understanding of poetic metaphor and metaphoricity, which he argues describes “a less known 
domain—human reality—in the light of relationships within a fictitious but better known 
domain—the tragic tale.”67 For Ricoeur, the power of metaphor lies in its relation to the 
heuristic function of fiction and poetry. He sees metaphor not within the lens of semantics or 
semiotics but hermeneutics:  
metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the power that certain 
fictions have to redescribe reality. … From this conjunction of fiction and redescription 
I conclude that the ‘place’ of metaphor … is neither the name, nor the sentence, nor 
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even discourse, but the copula of the verb to be. The metaphorical ‘is’ at once signifies 
both ‘is not’ and ‘is like.’68  
This concept of metaphor is non-traditional. Whereas the common definition of metaphor is 
that of a “word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea [that] is used in place of 
another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them,”69 Ricoeur expands the concept’s 
domain from the ‘word or phrase’ to reality itself. That is, the metaphoricity of poems or stories 
does not merely suggest similarities between them and reality; rather, the meaning that this 
metaphoricity impresses upon the receiver (i.e., the reader, listener, etc.) can redescribe reality 
in terms of the poetic or the fictive itself.  
Ricoeur draws much of his understanding of the ‘redescription’ of this world in terms of the 
potential, virtual world—of fiction, poetry, or imagined futures—from Mary Hesse’s analysis 
of the metaphoricity of (scientific) models, and Hesse, in turn, draws from Max Black’s 
interaction theory. In the interaction theory of metaphor there are two semantic systems: the 
‘primary’ and the ‘secondary’ systems, each of which one can describe in literal language. The 
“metaphoric use of language in describing the primary system consists of transferring to it a 
word or words normally used in connection with the secondary system.”70 Moreover, for this 
transference and conjunction of semantic systems to work as a metaphor, “it is necessary that 
there should be patent falsehood or even absurdity in taking the conjunction literally.”71 A 
common example of a metaphor that abides by the rules of interaction theory is ‘Man is a wolf.’ 
Of course, man is not a wolf; the statement is false. However, in the conjunction of these two 
semantic systems (i.e., Man and Wolf), something happens: “The metaphor works by 
transferring the associated ideas and implications of the secondary [i.e., Wolf] to the primary 
[i.e., Man] system. These select, emphasize, or suppress features of the primary; new slants on 
the primary are illuminated; the primary is ‘seen through’ the frame of the secondary.”72 This 
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transference and conjunction of the secondary system to the primary system changes the 
associated ideas of the primary system; in other words, the primary system is “redescribed in 
terminology transferred from the secondary system.”73 Redescription explains how the model 
and metaphor produce new meaning and, therefore, allow for approximate prediction.  
The orthodox view of the explanatory value of scientific models, Hesse claims, wrongly 
assumes that one can logically deduce the explanans from the explanandum; in fact, 
deducibility is quite rare. Rather, the relations between explanans and explanandum tend to be 
approximate, and the validity of this approximation cannot itself be deduced, “but is a 
complicated function of coherence with the rest of a theoretical system.”74 Beyond this first 
relation of approximation between the explanans and the explanandum, there is a further 
approximation: the explanandum is not the phenomenon itself that is to be explained but, 
rather, a description of it in language. Thus, we now have a phenomenon, a statement in the 
domain of the explanandum, and a statement in the domain of the explanans, neither of which 
is wholly deducible from the other. The orthodox view cannot properly account for prediction 
in theoretical explanation because, in order to be predictive, “general laws already present in 
the explanans were to incorporate events that are not yet observable.”75 In other words, because 
the orthodox view of explanation relies on deducibility from available empirical data, it cannot 
account for data which has not yet surfaced. Meanwhile, in the metaphoric view, because the 
primary system is redescribed in terms of the secondary, “it is to be expected that the original 
observation language will both be shifted in meaning and extended in vocabulary, and hence 
that predictions in the strong sense will become possible.”76 In order to understand how a 
scientific model can be both explanatory and predictive, we must understand how metaphor 
creates new meaning through the production of hypothetical or virtual worlds. 
Ricoeur analyzes the meaning-making capabilities of metaphor through the concepts of muthos 
(tragic poetry) and mimêsis (mythological representation of “that which is human”) from 
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Aristotle’s Poetics,77 and through various modern theories of metaphor. Like Hesse, Ricoeur’s 
interpretation of metaphor comes, in part, from Max Black, and he writes that metaphor 
“cannot be translated without ‘loss of cognitive content’ [Black 46]. Being untranslatable, it 
carries new information; briefly, it tells us something.”78 This untranslatability of metaphor 
comes from Black’s (and Ricoeur’s) elevation of semantics over semiology, which makes the 
substitution of words in a metaphorical statement impossible.79 If a metaphorical statement has 
the same meaning after a word-substitution, then the metaphorical term “carries no new 
information, since the absent term (if one exists) can be brought back in; and if there is no 
information conveyed, then metaphor has only an ornamental, decorative value.”80 But 
metaphor has more than ornamental value; it produces meaning by transference and 
conjunction. As Hesse explains, the metaphorical statement makes meaning insofar as the 
interaction between the primary and secondary semantic systems leaves certain elements out, 
highlights others, and frames features of the primary system in terms of the secondary.  
The conjunction of the primary and secondary systems in a metaphorical statement produces 
meaning and, through this interaction, the metaphor implies something other than itself—it 
suggests a secondary level of signification or ‘connotation.’81 The distinction between 
denotation and connotation aligns with that between Frege’s concepts of sense and reference, 
which is the difference between “what the proposition states [i.e. the sense, ‘denotation’] … 
[and] that about which the sense is stated [i.e. the reference, ‘connotation’].”82 Ricoeur is not 
merely interested in the structure of sense and reference; instead, he aims to discover what the 
metaphorical statement says about reality.83 Therefore, he turns to the Poetics to discover 
metaphor’s relation to muthos and mimêsis. 
 
77 Ricoeur, Metaphor, 45. 
78 Ibid., 101. 
79 Ibid., 87. 
80 Ibid., 21. 
81 Ibid., 105. 
82 Ibid., 256. 





In order to gain access to Aristotle’s conception of metaphor, Ricoeur looks to both the 
Rhetoric and the Poetics; for it is between the lexis (language-expression) of rhetoric and 
muthos (tragic poetry) that metaphor most properly comes to light. Crucially, Ricoeur notes 
that Aristotle appeals “to the characteristic of all metaphor, which is to point out or show, to 
‘make visible.’ And this feature brings us to the heart of the problem of lexis, whose function 
… is to ‘make discourse appear to the senses.’”84 Thus, there is an element of action in 
metaphor—other than the notion of transference that we have already established—which 
serves to make something visible or tangible ‘to the senses.’ The activity of metaphor—the 
doing or making of something, the rendering-apparent or rendering-sensible—establishes, for 
Ricoeur, the connection between the metaphor of the Rhetoric and that of the Poetics because 
of the mimêsis that tragic muthos entails.  
The transition from a discussion of lexis to one of muthos is a transition from speaking of the 
structural, linguistic elements of a text to the overall semantic network—the ‘world’—of a text. 
Muthos, the interior organizing and ordering force of the text, is externally reflected in lexis, 
“which exteriorizes and makes explicit the internal order of muthos.”85 But muthos is 
subordinate to another poetic force: mimêsis.86 Nonetheless, mimêsis and muthos together 
portray something much more powerful than mere imitation of reality via text:  
muthos is not just a rearrangement of human action into a more coherent form, but a 
structuring that elevates this action; so mimêsis preserves and represents that which is 
human, not just in its essential features, but in a way that makes it greater and nobler. 
There is thus a double tension proper to mimêsis: on the one hand, the imitation is at 
once a portrayal of human reality and an original creation; on the other, it is faithful to 
things as they are and it depicts them as higher and greater than they are.87  
This tension inherent in mimêsis—as a faithful portrayal which, in its depiction, ennobles and 
aggrandizes that which it depicts—is key to understanding the function of metaphor in poetry. 
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For, as mentioned above, Ricoeur is interested in what the metaphor says about reality, and it 
is through the tension of mimêsis that the metaphor has reference to a world—whether the real 
world or that of the text: “the subordination of muthos to mimêsis gives the stylistic process a 
global aim[.] … Related to the imitation of our actions at their best, [metaphor] takes part in 
the double tension [of mimêsis] that characterizes this imitation: submission to reality and 
fabulous invention, unaltering representation and ennobling elevation.”88 Through the 
workings of poetic metaphor (poetic because we are working through an outgrowth of muthos, 
i.e. tragic poetry) a world appears to our senses; that is, this ‘mimetic’ tension in metaphor is 
productive insofar as it suggests an exterior. It refers to the fictive world of the text, which 
itself refers to the ‘real world,’ or ‘reality,’ but is explicitly not reality; the phrase, “‘It was and 
it was not,’ … contains in nuce all that can be said about metaphorical truth.”89 
We must now address poetry, the realm of the poetic, and the poetic function in order to 
properly grasp the world to which the metaphor refers. As outlined above, insofar as a 
metaphorical statement is literally false, the metaphor refers not to the ‘real’ but to the 
‘metaphorical,’ that is, it refers not to reality but to the ‘world of the poem,’ or the metaphorical 
realm. However, the world of the poem to which the metaphorical statement refers is not 
untrue; it is hypothetical. On this point, Ricoeur approaches the notion of the ‘poetic 
hypothesis’ developed by Northrop Frye, which is “the suggestion or proposal, in imaginative, 
fictive mode, of a world. Hence, suspension of real reference [i.e., reference to ‘reality’] is the 
condition of access to the virtual mode of reference. … [T]he function of poetry [is] to establish 
another world … that corresponds to other possibilities of existence … that would be most 
deeply our own.”90 In other words, in the transference of meaning between semantic systems 
in the metaphorical statement, a world—the ‘virtual’ world of the text—is produced, to which, 
simultaneously, the metaphor refers as its truth. The virtual world of the text is not a container 
in which the metaphor exists and to which it refers; rather, the text and its world comprise a 
metaphorical network. Thus, as we saw above, the metaphor’s referential function “should be 
carried by a metaphoric network[.] … [M]etaphoricity [in tragic muthos] consists in describing 
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a less known domain – human reality – in the light of relationships within a fictitious but better 
known domain – the tragic tale – utilizing all the strengths of ‘systematic deployability’ 
contained in that tale.”91 This ‘describing in light of …’ is the ‘redescription’ that Hesse 
attributes to metaphor, which she argues should also be attributed to scientific models. And 
Ricoeur, after elaborating Hesse’s understanding of models and metaphor, writes that “what 
on the poetic side corresponds exactly to the model is not precisely what we have called the 
‘metaphorical statement,’ … as the model consists in a complex network of statements, its 
exact analogue would be the extended metaphor – tale, allegory.”92 Thus, the model is 
predictive insofar as it produces a virtual world to which it refers. This new world established 
by the poetic imitates our world and our actions, “but this mimêsis passes through creation of 
a plot,” and, as mentioned above, involves the description of human reality in the light of the 
fictitious reality of the tragic tale.93  
There is a sense in which the new world that the poetic establishes has a heuristic function 
insofar as it articulates a mood that can provide guidance for action in the non-virtual world, 
i.e., this world. Ricoeur writes that the “feeling articulated by the poem … signifies … the 
elevation of feeling to the hypthetical [sic], and the creation of an affective fiction. … The 
paradox of the poetic can be summed up entirely in this, that the elevation of feeling to fiction 
is the condition of its mimetic use. Only a feeling transformed into myth can open and discover 
the world.”94 Thus, the poetic, as an ‘affective fiction,’ depicts human reality within the 
framework of the ‘story,’ the ‘myth,’ and this virtual redescription of this world can help guide 
our actions in this world. Kuhn, too, articulates a concept of world-creation that arises within 
a new paradigm: “the scientist with a new paradigm sees differently from the way he had seen 
before,”95 “[c]onfronting the same constellation of objects as before and knowing that he does 
so, he nevertheless finds them transformed through and through in many of their details,”96 and 
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“after a revolution scientists work in a different world.”97 For Kuhn, this ‘new world’ presents 
the scientist with an impetus for action, that is, the practice of normal scientific research. For 
Rorty, this ‘recontextualization’ is the inspiration for imagining and envisioning a new, better 
world. And, for Ricoeur, metaphor involves a sort of call to action, too. 
Arendt similarly discusses the importance of mimêsis, the poetic, and stories (or narratives)—
in the context of the discovery of the ‘who’ in the public realm, that is, the political agent or 
actor. It is not through action alone that one becomes a who; rather, it is through the story that 
is told of his actions. Julia Kristeva writes that narrative is able to “condense the action into an 
exemplary moment, to extract it from the continuous flow of time, and reveal a who. … Such 
a narrative … is fundamentally integrated into action.”98 The revelation of the who through 
this narrativized action is the means by which one individuates one’s self: “it is in action, as 
an ability to launch a beginning, that the human condition of individuation is actualized. The 
‘living flux of action and speech’ is demonstrated in mimēsis—which, according to Aristotle, 
Arendt emphasizes, does not indicate the imitation of an isolated character, but rather an 
‘imitation of action’—through ‘plot.’”99 Thus, we may consider Arendt’s notion of the 
memorable narrative, the story of heroic action, in the same vein as the heuristic of the affective 
fiction that Ricoeur describes. This is that of the ‘inspirational story’ that Rorty believes the 
contemporary Left must tell about the country (that is, in his case, America) in order to be the 
agent for change that it ought to be. 
Rorty, like Marcuse and Arendt, believes that the Left should not be implementing top-down 
changes, foisting the ‘better world’ upon the people. Instead, each of these thinkers desires that 
we ourselves take up our own betterment, our own liberation, as a task for ourselves. We must 
tell a true story about the possibilities that we can actualize without becoming pessimistic about 
our failures to realize these possibilities in the past and without becoming cynical about how 
realistic this actualization is. This story must be true in a unique way: this truth must arise in 
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the story’s resonance with human essence, which we have described as becoming, natal, and 
open to radical novelty and possibility. We need to be open to smaller changes because a large 
enough quantity of small changes can be revolutionary. This does not mean that we should shy 
away from larger changes, but that we cannot get hung up on the mass movement; we cannot 
become mired in discourse that leads to totalizing images of what we could become, such as 
the ‘new being in Christ’ or the ‘new socialist man.’ We must tell ourselves an affective fiction 
about what we could accomplish and how much better our world could be, and this fiction 
must depict our world in the light of a fictive world, a mythological world. A concrete theory 
of social change must involve the recognition of our past failures that does not condemn our 
present to ineptitude and stasis, that does not condemn our future because of the sins of our 
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